David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (2):169-182 (2005)
Because imagination constitutes an indispensable tool of phenomenology, e.g., in understanding another author’s description, in eidetic reduction, etc., the practicability of phenomenological method and its claim to objectivity ought to be reconsidered with regard to its dependence on imagination. Auditory imagery serves to illustrate problems involved in grasping and analyzing imaginative contents – loudness in this case. Similar to phonetic segmentation and classification, phenomenologists segment and classify mental acts and contents. Just as phoneticians rely on experts’ evaluations of notations to reach valid results, phenomenologists may try to develop similar agreement procedures to escape the ‘subjectivism’ of their solitary first-person approach.
|Keywords||imagination loudness phenomenological method phonetic analysis|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Mark L. Johnson (1987). The Body in the Mind: The Bodily Basis of Meaning, Imagination, and Reason. University of Chicago Press.
Edmund Husserl (1973). Experience and Judgment: Investigations in a Genealogy of Logic. Routledge and K. Paul.
Eduard Marbach (1993). Mental Representation and Consciousness: Toward a Phenomenological Theory of Representation and Reference. Kluwer.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Peter Baumann (2007). Experiencing Things Together: What is the Problem? Erkenntnis 66 (1-2):9 - 26.
Amie L. Thomasson (2005). First-Person Knowledge in Phenomenology. In David Woodruff Smith & Amie L. Thomasson (eds.), Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Clarendon Press 115--138.
Robert Denoon Cumming (1991). Phenomenology and Deconstruction. University of Chicago Press.
Shaun Gallagher & Jesper B. Sorensen (2006). Experimenting with Phenomenology. Consciousness and Cognition 15 (1):119-134.
Philip J. Bartok (2005). Brentano's Intentionality Thesis: Beyond the Analytic and Phenomenological Readings. Journal of the History of Philosophy 43 (4):437-460.
Walter Hopp (2009). Phenomenology and Fallibility. Husserl Studies 25 (1):1-14.
Steven Brown (2008). Must Phenomenology Rest on Paradox?: Implications of Methodology-Limited Theories. Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (12):5-32.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads19 ( #206,524 of 1,934,701 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #269,464 of 1,934,701 )
How can I increase my downloads?