David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (2):169-182 (2005)
Because imagination constitutes an indispensable tool of phenomenology, e.g., in understanding another author’s description, in eidetic reduction, etc., the practicability of phenomenological method and its claim to objectivity ought to be reconsidered with regard to its dependence on imagination. Auditory imagery serves to illustrate problems involved in grasping and analyzing imaginative contents – loudness in this case. Similar to phonetic segmentation and classification, phenomenologists segment and classify mental acts and contents. Just as phoneticians rely on experts’ evaluations of notations to reach valid results, phenomenologists may try to develop similar agreement procedures to escape the ‘subjectivism’ of their solitary first-person approach.
|Keywords||imagination loudness phenomenological method phonetic analysis|
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