Why free will remains a mystery

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (1):105-125 (2011)
Peter van Inwagen contends that free will is a mystery. Here I present an argument in the spirit of van Inwagen's. According to the Assimilation Argument, libertarians cannot plausibly distinguish causally undetermined actions, the ones they take to be exercises of free will, from overtly randomized outcomes of the sort nobody would count as exercises of free will. I contend that the Assimilation Argument improves on related arguments in locating the crucial issues between van Inwagen and libertarians who hope to demystify free will, while avoiding objections these arguments have faced
Keywords free will  libertarianism  mysterianism  Peter van Inwagen  Laura Waddell Ekstrom
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2010.01388.x
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References found in this work BETA
Alfred R. Mele (2007). Free Will and Luck. Philosophical Explorations 10 (2):153 – 155.

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Alfred Mele (2004). Can Libertarians Make Promises? In John Hyman & Helen Steward (eds.), Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. Cambridge University Press 217-241.
Peter van Inwagen (2000). Free Will Remains a Mystery. Philosophical Perspectives 14:1-20.
Peter van Inwagen (2004). Van Inwagen on Free Will. In Joseph K. Campbell (ed.), Freedom and Determinism. Cambridge MA: Bradford Book/MIT Press
John Martin Fischer (1986). Van Inwagen on Free Will. Philosophical Quarterly 36 (April):252-260.

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