Which properties are represented in perception?

In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press. 481--503 (2006)
Abstract
In discussions of perception and its relation to knowledge, it is common to distinguish what one comes to believe on the basis of perception from the distinctively perceptual basis of one's belief. The distinction can be drawn in terms of propositional contents: there are the contents that a perceiver comes to believe on the basis of her perception, on the one hand; and there are the contents properly attributed to perception itself, on the other. Consider the content
Keywords Content  Perception  Phenomenology  Properties
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Robert Briscoe (2009). Egocentric Spatial Representation in Action and Perception. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (2):423 - 460.
Ned Block (2010). Attention and Mental Paint1. Philosophical Issues 20 (1):23-63.

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