Abstract

This is a stimulating attempt to explore and expose some of the basic characteristics of intention. The book is divided into three sections. Part One categorizes various species of intention and sets out criteria to distinguish "purposive" and "non-purposive" intention as well as "conditional" and "unconditional" intention. Meiland's criteria require that he accept as an initial premiss the debatable principle "different descriptions, different intentions." He also presumes, albeit with some justification and explanation in Chapter three, that the paradigm object of intention is action. Part Two compares and contrasts intention with other mental states or events. There is a consideration of the relation of intention to deciding, deliberating, trying, and desiring, as well as some account of what is entailed in executing intentions. In Part Three, Meiland continues to investigate various aspects of intention by considering and denying several theories: that statements of intention are wholly or partly predictions; that intentions are beliefs that one will try to do X; that intentions are one or a set of a group of wants and beliefs; that intentions are dispositions. The book is an initial attempt to systematically examine a central concept of many areas of philosophy that is both complex and confused. There is included an extensive and useful, if not exhaustive, bibliography on intention and related problems.--S. S. C.