Underestimating the Physical

Journal of Consciousness Studies 26 (9-10):228-240 (2019)
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Abstract

Many hold that (1) consciousness poses a uniquely hard problem. Why is this so? Chalmers considers 12 main answers in 'The Meta-Problem of Consciousness'. This paper focuses on number 11, and is principally addressed to those who endorse (1) because they think that (2) consciousness can't possibly be physical. It argues that to hold (2) is to make the mistake of underestimating the physical, and that almost all who make this mistake do so because they think they know more about the physical than they do. When we see things right, we see that there is nothing in physics nor in our everyday experience of the physical that gives us any good reason to hold (2). This leaves us free to embrace the overwhelmingly strong reasons for accepting that (3) consciousness is wholly physical. The correct general response is the same as the response to wave-particle duality: acceptance without expectation of understanding.

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Galen Strawson
University of Texas at Austin

Citations of this work

Is the Hard Problem of Consciousness Universal?David Chalmers - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (5-6):227-257.
How Can We Solve the Meta-Problem of Consciousness?David Chalmers - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (5-6):201-226.
Russellian Physicalists get our phenomenal concepts wrong.Marcelino Botin - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (7):1829-1848.
Underestimating the World.Daniel Stoljar - forthcoming - Journal of Consciousness Studies.

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