Does the New Wave in Moral Psychology Sink Kant?

In Kelly James Clark (ed.), The Blackwell Companion to Naturalism. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley. pp. 336–350 (2016)
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Abstract

Some claim that recent work in moral psychology both undermines Kantian moral theory and supports Humean approaches to morality. Does moral psychology undermine Kantian, rationalistic moral theory? After distinguishing various Kantian claims and the evidence against them, I argue that the empirical case against Kantianism as a viable moral theory is not conclusive.

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9781118657775

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10.1002/9781118657775.ch24

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Valerie Tiberius
University of Minnesota

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