On pain and representational content
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
I appreciate that such a view needs argument which is not appropriate here. However, I think that there are independent reasons to think that Tye’s theses are problematical. It is difficult to see how these theses are consistent both with what we know about pains, and other perceptual experiences, and with the package of claims that are central to Tye's treatment of pain, and more generally of perceptual experiences, whereby phenomenal character is explained in terms of representational content [as presented in Tye (2000)].
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library||
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Uriah Kriegel (2004). Perceptual Experience, Conscious Content, and Nonconceptual Content. Essays in Philosophy 5 (1):1-14.
Michael Tye (1995). A Representational Theory of Pains and Their Phenomenal Character. Philosophical Perspectives 9:223-39.
Paul Noordhof (2005). In a State of Pain. In Murat Aydede (ed.), Pain: New Essays on its Nature and the Methodology of its Study. Cambridge Ma: Bradford Book/MIT Press
Uriah Kriegel (2002). PANIC Theory and the Prospects for a Representational Theory of Phenomenal Consciousness. Philosophical Psychology 15 (1):55-64.
Ned Block (2005). Bodily Sensations as an Obstacle for Representationism. In Murat Aydede (ed.), Pain: New Essays on its Nature and the Methodology of its Study. Cambridge Ma: Bradford Book/MIT Press 137-142.
Manolo Martínez (2011). Imperative Content and the Painfulness of Pain. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (1):67-90.
David Bain (2003). Intentionalism and Pain. Philosophical Quarterly 53 (213):502-523.
Wayne Wright (2003). McDowell, Demonstrative Concepts, and Nonconceptual Representational Content. Disputation 14 (14):1 - 16.
Barry Maund (2005). Michael Tye on Pain and Representational Content. In Murat Aydede (ed.), Pain: New Essays on its Nature and the Methodology of its Study. Cambridge Ma: Bradford Book/MIT Press
Added to index2009-08-16
Total downloads37 ( #113,033 of 1,911,323 )
Recent downloads (6 months)0
How can I increase my downloads?