The preface paradox and the problem of easy knowledge
| Abstract | The preface paradox is a problem for everyone; you don’t need to be committed to any special epistemological theory to face the problem it raises. The problem of easy knowledge is supposed to be different in this respect. It is generally thought to arise only for those who believe there is such a thing as basic knowledge, i.e. knowledge acquired through a source that one does not know to be reliable or trustworthy. Because it is thought to arise only for those who believe in basic knowledge, the problem of easy knowledge is generally regarded as a problem for, or objection to, the possibility of basic knowledge. | |||||||||
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