Indicative and subjunctive conditionals

Philosophical Quarterly 51 (203):200-216 (2001)
Abstract
This paper presents a new theory of the truth conditions for indicative conditionals. The theory allows us to give a fairly unified account of the semantics for indicative and subjunctive conditionals, though there remains a distinction between the two classes. Put simply, the idea behind the theory is that the distinction between the indicative and the subjunctive parallels the distinction between the necessary and the a priori. Since that distinction is best understood formally using the resources of two-dimensional modal logic, those resources will be brought to bear on the logic of conditionals.
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    References found in this work BETA
    V. H. Dudman (1994). Against the Indicative. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (1):17 – 26.

    View all 13 references

    Citations of this work BETA
    By Toby Handfield (2004). Counterlegals and Necessary Laws. Philosophical Quarterly 54 (216):402–419.
    J. Robert G. Williams (2008). Conversation and Conditionals. Philosophical Studies 138 (2):211 - 223.

    View all 9 citations

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