La vieille question du statut ontologique du présent refait aujourd’hui surface au travers du débat qui oppose présentisme et éternisme. Les présentistes défendent la thèse selon laquelle seul ce qui est présent existe. Les éternistes soutiennent quant à eux que le présent ne jouit d’aucun privilège ontologique, les choses passées et futures existant tout autant que les choses présentes. Dans cet article nous ne chercherons pas à départager les protagonistes mais à écarter les théories dites « hybrides » qui (...) prétendent bénéficier des avantages de chacune des positions sans hériter de leurs inconvénients. Nous commencerons par retracer le débat entre présentisme et éternisme (section 1), puis nous présenterons les motivations des défenseurs des théories hybrides (section 2). Enfin, dans notre dernière section, nous avancerons un argument qui, s’il est juste, montre que les théories hybrides ne sont pas cohérentes. (shrink)

The author explores the relationships among science, theology, and philosophy, and the way in which each relates to mythical language or statement. The starting point is the scientific nature of our culture and certain of its features which are untenable; the assumption is that a mythical, eternistic [[sic]] point of view of the traditional religious type constitutes the only alternative to that which takes as its model the experimental sciences. There is a review of the familiar incursions which science has (...) made into the theological domain, to the point where the latter has doubted its own legitimacy. The effort on behalf of religion begins by an evaluation of science: it is seen to be less exact, less rigorous, and more dramatic, more human than it often is thought to be. In effect, science does not know itself, and can hardly dictate the limits of religion on the basis of ideals which are illusory. In fact, science has a need for mythical presentation of its own interests and activities; it has its own myths, and some are at odds with others. For example, the notion of objective man is not wholly compatible with the notion of man as object. The way has been cleared to claim that mythical language is legitimate, that it is central to the religious enterprise, and that religious myth may even serve science in the very way that science and the methodology of science have often sought to serve religious discourse--as a therapeutic device. This depends on an historical perspective: given the role that myth has played in religion and the role that it now plays in science, a more felicitous situation would be achieved if some of our convictions about myth were radically revised. The role of the philosopher in this projected task is analyzed and described as central. The conclusion is that science, far from being the force that eliminates religious language, shows, in its own activity, the urgent need for religious language.--J. J. E. (shrink)