D. C. Stove's analysis of Popper's theory of scientific statements is vitiated by at least three errors, all of which stem from a crucial omission: that whilst Popper's theory of scientific statements is a theory of statements in science, Stove's restrictive analysis ignores the context of the statements and proceeds as though they were related to each other by nothing more than the logic of propositions, i.e. they appear in Stove's analysis as atomistic, as distinct from scientific statements.

The main burden of this paper is to point up what are considered to be serious shortcomings in Barrow's [1] argument that the ‘philosophically competent’ head should control a school's curriculum policy. At the same time, whilst exigencies of space prohibit a comprehensive defence of ‘participatory decision-making’ and its pertinence for schools [2], it will be argued that curriculum policy is best controlled by governing bodies of the type proposed by the Taylor Committee [3], given, of course, that such bodies (...) must operate within a framework of national and local authority policy. (shrink)

Alan Smithson; Philosophic Competence, Educational Policy and the Technocratic Threat to Democracy, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 17, Issue 2, 30 M.