This paper analyses the adjudicative methods of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) through the concept of ideology. In part one, I discuss Tamara Ćapeta’s application of Duncan Kennedy’s conception of ideology to the ECJ. I argue it has two shortcomings, both stemming from its account of ideology: treating ideology as pertaining primarily to individual beliefs rather than institutional practices, and not treating the denial of ideology itself as an instance of ideology. In part two, I present my alternative account (...) of ideology which is more structural and functional than Kennedy’s and focuses on uncovering mystification and de-contestation in the case law of the ECJ. In the last part, I argue that at least three features of the Court’s work can be identified as ideological through analysing the conflict between fundamental freedoms and fundamental rights: the methodology of breach/justification, the language of ‘fundamentality’ and ‘balancing’, and the practice of collegiality. (shrink)