Definite descriptions, I shall argue, have two possible functions. 1] They are used to refer to what a speaker wishes to talk about, but they are also used quite differently. Moreover, a definite description occurring in one and the same sentence may, on different occasions of its use, function in either way. The failure to deal with this duality of function obscures the genuine referring use of definite descriptions. The best known theories of definite descriptions, those of Russell and Strawson, (...) I shall suggest, are both guilty of this. Before discussing this distinction in use, I will mention some features of these theories to which it is especially relevant. (shrink)
Although the importance of the arts in healthcare is increasingly recognised, further research is needed to investigate the mechanisms by which arts and health programmes achieve their impact. An overview of the qualitative methods used to explore patients' perceptions of these interventions is lacking. We reviewed the literature to gain insights into the qualitative methods used to explore patients' perceptions of the role of arts in healthcare with a view to identifying the most common methodologies used and to guide researchers (...) embarking on research regarding patients' perceptions of arts in healthcare. Our results indicate a paucity of qualitative studies, a variety of methods used and variability of methodological rigour. Grounded theory and phenomenology were the most common approaches adopted, mixed methods approaches were relatively frequent, and versions of ‘thematic’ or ‘content’ analysis were commonly cited. Semi-structured interviews were the most popular data collection method. The emphasis of all of the studies was on active or participative arts engagement, with no focus on receptive engagement with the arts and aesthetics. It was concluded that careful consideration of appropriate methodology is important when researching such an exploratory and sensitive area. Individual interviews were most popular and might be appropriate when exploring personal, sensitive experiences. Mixed method studies possibly provide a comprehensive approach which might satisfy both the arts and healthcare settings need for evidence. It seems important to pay attention to rigour in any methodology chosen and a greater focus on receptive engagement with the arts might be encouraged in future research. (shrink)
Keith Donnellan (1931 – ) began his studies at the University of Maryland, and earned his Bachelor’s degree from Cornell University. He stayed on at Cornell, earning a Master’s and a PhD in 1961. He also taught at there for several years before moving to UCLA in 1970, where he is currently Emeritus Professor of Philosophy. Donnellan’s work is mainly in the philosophy of language, with an emphasis on the connections between semantics and pragmatics. His most influential work (...) was his 1966 paper “Reference and Definite Descriptions”. In this paper, he challenges the canonical view, due to Bertrand Russell, about definite descriptions. Russell had argued that the proper semantic treatment of a definite description such as “the present king of France” was quantificational. Thus, a sentence like “the present king of France is bald” should be analyzed as “There exists one and only one entity x that is the present king of France, and x is bald”. Donnellan argues that in natural languages, there are actually two different kinds of uses of definite descriptions. Russell’s analysis picks out the “attributive” use of definite descriptions. When we use a definite description (“the F”) this way, we mean to make statements about the unique entity x that is F. However, Donnellan notes that we also sometimes use definite descriptions “referentially” to pick out a given entity and say something about it. To see this, imagine you are at a party where virtually everyone is drinking beer. However, you and your friend are observing a man in a corner of the room holding a martini glass. Unbeknownst to you, the man’s glass is filled with water. You turn to your friend and ask, “who is the man drinking a martini?” Suppose further that your friend knows that the man in question is Fred and that Fred’s glass is filled with water. According to the Russellian attributive analysis, such a question would amount to asking for the identity of the one and only one man drinking a martini. But the presupposition that there is a man drinking a martini is false, and so there should be no answer to the question.. (shrink)
Keith Donnellan has advanced an interpretation of Kripke's well-known "Puzzle About Belief" according to which the puzzle concerns the true nature of beliefs. In this paper I argue that the puzzle merely concerns problems that others can have in "reporting" a confused individual's beliefs. I conclude that a new-Fregean account of belief- ascription is best- equipped to solve the puzzle.
Donnellan's distinction between the referential and attributive uses of definite descriptions is shown not to cover exhaustive and exclusive alternatives but to fix the termini of a continuum of cases. in fact, donnellan's distinction rests on a mixed classification: the referential use, concerned with intended referents regardless of what speakers may say about them; the attributive use, concerned with definite descriptions used in using sentences, that something or other may satisfy. given this feature of his account, it is (...) easy to construct counterexamples of a hybrid nature. related views (stalnaker's, kaplan's, stampe's) are briefly canvassed. (shrink)
El objetivo de este artículo es examinar los contraejemplos más importantes formulados por Keith Donnellan frente a la teoría descriptiva de la referencia de los nombres propios, así como presentar una réplica a los mismos. La versión de la teoría descriptiva de la referencia que tomamos en consideración es la propuesta por Searle y Strawson, y en nuestra réplica a los contraejemplos más importantes de Donnellan hacemos hincapié en dos de los tipos de descripciones o propiedades a las (...) que estos autores apelan, a saber, las propiedades involucradas en la capacidad de reconocimiento asociada con un nombre y las descripciones parásitas. The aim of this paper is to examine the most important counterexamples put forward by Keith Donnellan against the description theory of the reference of proper names, as well as to present a reply to them. The version of the description theory of reference we take into consideration is the one proposed by Searle and Strawson, and in our reply to Donnellan's most important counterexamples we emphasize two of the sorts of descriptions or properties these authors resort to, that is, the properties involved in the capacity of recognition associated with a name and the parasitic descriptions. (shrink)
When discussing the distinction between referential and attributive uses of definite descriptions, Keith Donnellan also mentions cases such as âSmithâs murderer is insaneâ, uttered in a scenario in which Smith committed suicide. In this essay, I defend a two-fold thesis: (i) the alleged intuition that utterances of âSmithâs murderer is insaneâ are true in the scenario in question is independent from the phenomenon of referential uses of definite description, and, most importantly, (ii) even if such intuition is granted semantic (...) relevance, the evidence it presents is compatible with a Russellian treatment of definite descriptions. I thus present a Russellian analysis of âSmithâs murderer is insaneâ which, when coupled with certain independently plausible hypotheses, explains the presumed intuition that certain utterances of this sentence are indeed true, at least as long as the intended individual is insane. (shrink)
Here, I defend the view that fictional narratives are illusionary and that fictional names are to be accounted metalinguistically, a blend of Walton’s and Donnellan’s theories. Besides, I offer a remedial semantic for sentences external to the story which connects those uses back to the text of the story and to the neighborhood of its retellings.