The claim that phenomenal consciousness essentially involves self-consciousness, in the sense of _mineness_, has gained momentum in recent years. In this paper, I discuss the main non-phenomenological, theoretical argument for this claim: the so-called “transcendental argument” for universal mineness (Zahavi 2018, p. 711), which, in essence, corresponds to Shoemaker’s critique of the perceptual model of self-consciousness. I point out the potential of the transcendental argument, but most importantly its limitations. And I show that, even if successful, the argument cannot vindicate (...) the claim of an essential connection between phenomenal consciousness and self-consciousness. Since the transcendental argument is depicted as the “central argument” for universal mineness (Zahavi 2018, p. 711), I contend that, in view of its failure, the claim that all of my experiences have to be given to me _as mine_, all of your experiences have to be given to you _as yours_, etc., appears insufficiently substantiated. The idea that there is an essential connection between phenomenal consciousness and self-consciousness must be called into question. (shrink)

Merleau-Ponty's philosophy of the body is often highlighted primarily for its emphasis on the conscious dimension of embodiment. What tends to be over-looked, however, is Merleau-Ponty's attempt to overcome the threat of a bifurcation of the body that this emphasis brings with it. In view of this, I show how Merleau-Ponty develops his theory of the human being as a mind-body-unity and how he aims to bridge the gap between the bodily and the conscious by way of the notion of (...) being-in-the-world. (shrink)