This article investigates the deep-rooted logical structures underlying our thinking about other animals with a particular focus on topics relevant for cognitive primate research. We begin with a philosophical propaedeutic that makes perspicuous how we are to differentiate ontological from epistemological considerations regarding primates, while also accounting for the many perplexities that will undoubtedly be encountered upon applying this difference to concrete phenomena. Following this, we give an account of what is to be understood by the assertion of a thesis (...) of anthropological difference, identifying, inter alia, a property that fulfils the exclusivity, universality, and constitution criteria and demarcates the differentia specifica between humans and other animals. Also, we systematically develop how such theses can be formulated more moderately. Furthermore, we account for different theoretical frameworks, argumentative schemes, and sociological factors whose employment is associated with theses as such. This endeavor is carried out under the guise of anthropomorphism and anthropodenial. Doing so, we show that both are favored by the logic of cognitive primate research. Put briefly, concepts like cladistic parsimony and arguments by analogy favor anthropomorphism whereas concepts like traditional parsimony and Morgan’s canon favor anthropodenial. We close by framing these topics in the light of the self-other category mistake that lies in ascribing exclusive self-properties to some other. Lastly, we probe this category mistake for potency and scope of implications and find it to be central to and unavoidably ingrained in our thinking about other animals. (shrink)

Various studies have shown a decrease in well-being and an increase in mental health problems during the COVID-19 pandemic; however, only a few studies have explored fear, depression, and well-being cross-culturally during this time. Accordingly, we present the results of a cross-cultural study that compares these mental health scores for German and South African students, compares the correlations among them, and identifies COVID-19 fear, well-being, and depression predictors. German and South African societies differ from each other socio-culturally, politically, and economically. (...) Their university systems also differ to a large extent. University students in both countries completed the Fear of COVID-19 Scale, the World Health Organization-Five Well-Being Index, and the Patient Health Questionnaire-9. Welch’s t-test, correlation, and multiple regression analyses were performed. German students were found to have statistically lower levels of COVID-19 fear and depression, but lower levels of general well-being than South African students. In both samples, fear of COVID-19 was negatively correlated with well-being and positively associated with female gender and depression. Additionally, female gender, depression, and lower well-being were identified as predictors of COVID-19 fear in both samples. The findings indicate that the fear of COVID-19 is associated with and varies according to gender, depression, and well-being across cultures, and that the difference in the intensity of fear between German and South African students may be partly explained by cultural and contextual differences. These findings can create a deeper understanding of the pandemic’s impact on student communities and may be used by mental health practitioners and researchers to develop and apply culture-specific interventions. (shrink)

Deep Disagreements from the Logico-Pragmatical Point of View: An Analysis of Disagreements Based on Moyal-Sharrock’s Interpretation of Wittgenstein’s On Certainty. Argumentation is central to philosophy. One of its primary functions is to resolve disagreement. Yet, there are cases of disagreement that undercut the conditions of possibility for argumentation themselves: deep disagreements. In his seminal paper, Fogelin conceived of deep disagreements in Wittgensteinian terms by highlighting their “grammatical” character. Other than normal disagreements, which are located in the space of giving and (...) receiving reasons, deep disagreements are concerned with what enables reasoning in the first place. Hence, they cannot be rationally resolved. Drawing on an interpretation of Moyal-Sharrock’s account of Wittgensteinian certainties, my logico-grammatical account proposes that deep disagreements pertain to certainties, viz. non-proposional ways of acting in the life-world that are epistemologically basic. Furthermore, the logico-grammatical analysis entails a gradual conception of the transition from normal to deep disagreements by differentiating different types and origins of certainties and specifying which forms of certainty can and cannot be dropped. Also, it allows to identify participating in the human form of life and discursive capabilities as conditions of possibility of disagreements. Consequently, it can specify the turning-point at which disagreement transforms into mere difference. It is at this point that the focus of a dispute switches from the rationality of the discourse to that of the agents of discourse. (shrink)