It is argued that neoliberal political ideology has redefined the regulatory state to have greater convergence of interests and goals with the pharmaceutical industry than previously, particularly regarding acceleration and cost reduction of drug development and regulatory review. Consequently, the pharmaceutical industry has been permitted to set the agenda about how shorter term and cheaper alternative carcinogenicity testing systems are investigated for validity. The authors contend that, with the tacit approval of the neoliberal regulatory state, the commercial interests of the (...) pharmaceutical industry framed the process and interpretation of validating these new test systems, thereby influencing what counts as knowledge about the carcinogenic status of new pharmaceuticals. While such alternative tests were occasioned by “molecularization,” the framing of their validation was not determined by technoscientific logic or a lack of standards of validation, but by the sociopolitical goals of the controlling institutions. Indeed, a different validation process could have been conducted had the priority been to develop carcinogenicity testing in the interests of public-health protection. While the resulting validation indicated that the short-term alternative tests posed small risks to the commercial interests of pharmaceutical firms, they provided little reassurance that patients would not be exposed to greater risks than before from undetected carcinogens. (shrink)

This article examines the regulation of nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drugs, with particular focus on products approved for marketing in the United Kingdom, while denied marketing approval in the United States on safety grounds, and then subsequently withdrawn from the UK market on those grounds. Using international comparison of regulatory data never before accessed outside government and companies, together with interviews with relevant industry scientists and regulators, the article demonstrates the importance of regulatory expectations, deficits and paradigms. It is argued both that (...) these sociological concepts can be enriched by their application to detailed comparative case study of regulatory science, and that they provide an important policy-relevant framework with which to understand discrepant drug regulatory processes in a sociohistorical context. It is found that regulatory expectations and paradigms may be regarded as mediating factors between political culture and structural interests, on the one hand, and the outcomes of regulatory science, on the other. (shrink)

This article explores the social frameworks guiding expert and nonexpert perspectives on medicines safety in the U.K. Scientific experts from the Committee on the Safety of Medicines and the Medicines Commission were interviewed, and three nonexpertgroups, including patients and health professionals, were studied by the administration of questionnaires and focused group discussions. The research examined to what extent these groups subscribed to technocratic or democratic approaches to medicines regula tion and how this might be related to values toward technological risk. (...) The results reveal that there is substantial divergence between expert and nonexpert perspectives on medicines regulation, and that this derives as much from value differences as from any informational deficits. However, there seems to be some scope for shared values between some experts and some nonexperts, especially as regards state secrecy. The article concludes by discussing how those values could be used to foster a new "social contract of expertise" in which scientists are more democratically accountable and patients take more responsibility in governing medical risks. (shrink)

This article examines how scientists and regulators distribute the benefit of the doubt about drug safety under conditions of scientific uncertainty. The focus of the empirical research is the regulatory controversy over the hepatorenal toxicity of benoxaprofen in the United Kingdom and the United States. By scrutinizing the technical coherence of the arguments put forward by industrial and government scientists, it is concluded that these scientists are willing to award the commercial interests of the pharmaceutical industry an enormous benefit of (...) the sccentific doubt, which is not consistent with the best interests of patients. Interpretative flexibility, the burden of proof falling on regulators and their trust in, and dependence on, industrial scientists facilitates that distribution of the benefit of the scientific doubt. However, regulatory authorities' need for viability and the rationality common to opposing scientific views suggest that it is possible, in principle, to alter this dominant trend. To achieve adequate patient protection, drug regulation in the United Kingdom and the United States requires extensive reform. Some preliminary policy changes are sketched. (shrink)

The controversy over the prescription drug, alosetron, is examined in order to investigate what is permitted to count as ‘therapeutic advance’ and ‘therapeutic breakthrough’ within pharmaceutical innovation and regulation. It is argued that those official accounting categories can mask very modest efficacy of some drugs by reference to the official techno-scientific evidence, thus leading to questionable acceptance of risks to public health. This is explained by: the drug availability options set by the commercial interests of manufacturers; the FDA management's need (...) to demonstrate rapid approval of therapeutic advances to their budgetary masters, especially in the context of patient demands for access to new drugs; and the increasing capacity of patient groups, sometimes in collaboration with pharmaceutical manufacturers, to challenge techno-scientific expertise and evidence with experiential testimony. It is concluded that regulatory policy-makers need much more sophisticated accounting systems for differentiating between drugs defined as significant therapeutic advances, and between drugs (‘therapeutic breakthroughs’ fast-tracked to treat serious or life-threatening conditions. Contrary to some STS analyses, the desirability of an ascendancy of patients’ anecdotal evidence in regulatory decisions for public health is questioned. (shrink)

Drawing on case studies from the modern era of pharmaceutical regulation in the UK, US and Europe, I examine how the extent and distribution of trust between regulators, the pharmaceutical industry, and the medical profession about drug testing and monitoring influences knowledge and regulatory judgements about the efficacy and safety of prescription drugs. Introducing the concepts of ‘acquiescent’ and ‘investigative’ norms of regulatory trust, I demonstrate how investigative norms of regulatory trust—which deter pharmaceutical companies from assuming that their data analyses (...) will be accepted without independent de-construction—drive up bioethical and regulatory standards of drug assessment in the interests of health. By contrast, acquiescent norms of regulatory trust, which are associated with industrial capture and professional closure of interests, promote permissive standards allowing patients to take pharmaceuticals with greater risks to health and less evidence of therapeutic efficacy. (shrink)