Prior research shows taxpayers’ perceptions of fairness leads to greater cooperation and compliance with tax authorities. Yet our understanding of tax fairness has been hampered by its general reliance upon models and measures of fairness developed by organizational fairness research, even though fairness is a perception subject to contextual influences. Accordingly, we attempt to gain insight into the influence of contextual factors on fairness through the development of a theoretically based and empirically derived model of tax fairness, grounded in organizational (...) literature, but empirically tested in the tax context. Our analysis shows the extent to which items and dimensions found in the organizational fairness literature reflect taxpayers’ perceptions of tax fairness. Most importantly, our findings contribute to fairness research by identifying the role of relevant comparison groups in affecting perceptions of fairness, and thereby extends our understanding of the role of context in affecting fairness perceptions. Furthermore, by identifying the dimensions and items incorporated in perceptions of tax fairness, our study provides a foundation for tax researchers and policy makers to determine how best to promote voluntary taxpayers’ compliance and in so doing, mitigate tax avoidance and tax evasion. (shrink)

Although the role of fairness in tax compliance has been of increasing interest among the academic and professional tax communities, very little is known about the role of interactional fairness. Interactional fairness refers to the quality of the treatment provided to individuals from authority figures, such as tax authority representatives. We conduct an experiment using US taxpayers to examine the role of interactional fairness on tax compliance intentions, and how detection influences this relation. Taxpayers’ detection salience reflects their perceptions that (...) they will be audited by the tax authority. Using insights from conditional cooperation theory, we predict and find that detection moderates the relation between interactional fairness and tax compliance intentions, such that the effect of interactional fairness on tax compliance intentions diminishes with higher detection. We discuss the implications of our results for tax policy. (shrink)

Although the role of fairness in tax compliance has been of increasing interest among the academic and professional tax communities, very little is known about the role of interactional fairness. Interactional fairness refers to the quality of the treatment provided to individuals from authority figures, such as tax authority representatives. We conduct an experiment using US taxpayers to examine the role of interactional fairness on tax compliance intentions, and how detection influences this relation. Taxpayers’ detection salience reflects their perceptions that (...) they will be audited by the tax authority. Using insights from conditional cooperation theory, we predict and find that detection moderates the relation between interactional fairness and tax compliance intentions, such that the effect of interactional fairness on tax compliance intentions diminishes with higher detection. We discuss the implications of our results for tax policy. (shrink)

Guilt is a powerful emotion that is known to influence ethical decision-making. Nevertheless, the role of guilt cognitions in influencing restorative behaviour following an unethical action is not well understood. Guilt cognitions are interrelated beliefs about an individual’s role in a negative event. We experimentally investigate the joint impact of three guilt cognitions—responsibility for a decision, justification for a decision, and foreseeability of consequences—on a taxpayer’s decision to make a tax amnesty disclosure. Tax amnesties encourage delinquent taxpayers to self-correct to (...) avoid severe penalties that would result if their tax evasion were discovered. Our findings suggest a three-way interaction effect such that taxpayers are likely to make tax amnesty disclosures when they foresee that they will be caught by the tax authority, unless they can diffuse responsibility for their evasion and justify their evasion. Implications for tax policy and tax professionals are discussed. (shrink)

Since taking office, the President of the United States has consistently refused to make his tax returns available for public scrutiny. In so doing, he has broken with presidential tradition and kept people guessing about what his tax returns would show if they were disclosed. Interestingly enough, in the absence of concrete knowledge about the President’s tax circumstances, some taxpayers perceive that he did not pay his fair share and others perceive that he did. This situation presents an opportunity for (...) us to consider how vertical equity perceptions about the President’s fair share of taxes, and identification with the President via voting behavior, are jointly associated with taxpayers’ compliance. Using insights from equity theory as reported in Adams Advances in experimental social psychology, Academic Press, New York, 1965) and social learning theory as reported in Bandura, we anticipate and find that those taxpayers who perceive that the President did not pay his fair share of taxes and who most closely socially identify with him have the lowest tax compliance. We use a survey of 600 American taxpayers to capture their perceptions of vertical equity, voting behavior, and tax compliance intentions. Our results may reflect that taxpayers who identify with the President will tend to model his tax-related actions, or may also indicate that some taxpayers vote for a president whose actions are similar to their own. Insights and implications for ethics and tax researchers and tax policy makers are discussed. (shrink)

This article synthesizes insights from deterrence theory and social psychology literature on retributive justice to develop and test a theoretical model which predicts how and why observers’ tax compliance intentions are influenced by knowledge of the punitive outcomes faced by individuals found guilty of tax fraud. We test our model experimentally on a sample of Canadian taxpayers and manipulate perceived responsibility for a fraud and whether a fraud perpetrator is punished. We show that observers’ tax compliance increases when a fraud (...) perpetrator is punished only when the perpetrator is perceived as blameworthy. The psychological process through which this positive influence operates is relatively complex, as it includes perceptions of punishment deservingness and affect. We also find that tax compliance decreases when a tax fraud perpetrator is unpunished, regardless of perceived blameworthiness. Our results are robust when we control for economic determinants known to influence fraud. The article concludes by discussing our findings’ implications for fraud research and policy. (shrink)