This paper explores some variants and aspects of multi-quantificational criteria of existence, examining these in the context of the debate between monism and pluralism in analytical philosophy. Assuming familiarity with the findings to date, we seek to apply to these the newly introduced concepts of “substitution” and “substitutional model”. Possible applications of formal theories involving multiple types of existential quantifier are highlighted, together with their methods of construction. These considerations then lead to a thesis asserting the irrelevance of both multi-quantificational (...) criteria and assumptions involving quantificational ontology to the debate between monism and pluralism in ontology. Many quantifiers cannot properly distinguish different modes of existence–as we aim to show by furnishing a general method for constructing counter-examples to any theory that assumes that different types of existential quantifier correspond to different modes of existence. (shrink)

We aim to show from a new perspective that Quine’s ontological relativity, based largely on his so-called “proxy-function argument”, falls short of being a rigorously coherent philosophical conception, as it exhibits significant formal defects. This new perspective enables exposing the shortcomings of Quine's position and suggests a possible reformulation of the original position. Moreover, we argue that his ontological relativity is inconsistent with the empirical data associated with some of our best physical theories, such as quantum mechanics. We refer to (...) fundamental concepts of philosophy and the foundations of mathematics in order to clarify our critique of Quine’s position concerning the relation between formalized theories and both what we can know about the real world and how we come to know it. (shrink)

We examine the intentional processes that correspond to conceptualizations of activities performed by subjects with the intention of achieving an objective. Taking as its basis a general framework of intentional processes, two types of such process are considered: epistemic ones, aimed at acquiring knowledge about something, and poietic ones, aimed at bringing about something. The “something” is understood as anything that the processes can pertain to: a physical, mental or abstract object, a phenomenon, a state of affairs, etc. The generic (...) features of such processes are discussed, with focus on: features that are common for epistemic and poietic intentional processes as well as on features that differentiate them, the dynamic and static features of the processes, and on issues involved in controlling the progression of the processes towards intended objectives. The latter issue is the essential part of our considerations, the two former establish the necessary conceptual framework. The presented analysis aims at shedding light on these aspects of human intentional activities which can be considered virtually independent of any specific area of human intentional activity, be it natural sciences, humanities or technology. (shrink)