Since 1965 Belgian has stopped recognizing governments confining itself to the recognition of states only and maintaining diplomatie relations with the recognized states through wathever government able of exercising effective controle of those states' territory. Nota single exception to this doctrine was made untill 1979.In 1979 however Belgium refused to recognize the government installed in Phnom Penh following the Vietnamese intervention. One year later it also stopped recognizing the Khmer Rouge. In the UN however Belgium went on to accept the (...) Khmer Rouge delegation as the representatives of Cambodia, a state thus being represented by a delegation accredited by an entity that Belgium did not consider to be a government. This contradiction was maintained untill present since neither the coalition between the Khmer Rouge, Sihanouk and Son Sann nor the Supreme National Council were regarded by Belgium as governments.The article reconstructs the Belgium position out of the many statements and arguments the government bas put forward in the UN and the Belgian Parliament. The Belgian position is than examined in the light of international law, its own recognition doctrine and the international and domestic political context.This led to the conclusion that the legal grounds for the Belgian policy were rather weak and that its position almost completly differred from its traditional doctrine. In the Cambodian case however political considerations appeared to have prevailed Belgium chose to join the US, China and Asean and manoeuvred as to follow them in their condemnation of the Vietnamese intervention. Acting even as one of the most faithfull followers of the Asean policy towards Cambodia, Belgium enjoyed the improvement of its own relations with Asean, also in the commercial field.The continuous domestic opposition in and out of the Parliament was not able to change this policy. Even the present Minister of Foreign Alf airs who declared to be inclined to adjust the Belgian position had to hold back in order not to affect the esthablised relations. (shrink)

Most party by-laws are too inexhaustive and vague to be adequate guidelines for describing party chairmanship or predicting the actual proceedings of chairman elections. Although nearly all party by-laws prescribe competitive elections, one candidate elections occur in 68 % of the cases and in nearly 25% of all cases the unique candidate is elected by acclamation only. Also, when more candidates are presented, the preferences of the party oligarchy are mostly made very clear.The small number of elections that involve real (...) choice even diminishes when reelections or the appointment of interim chairman are taken into account: the percentage of "more than one candidate"-presentation drops from 32 % to respectively 19% and 16%. In Flemish parties there is less opportunity for choice then in Francophone parties: 22 % versus 38% "more than one candidate"-presentation. Moreover, the chairman elections of the Francophone parties involve larger electoral bodies : e.g. in some parties and already in 41 % of the cases all partymembers have a right to cast their vote. A possibility that exists in none of the Flemish parties. As far as the evolution over time is concerned: there is a general and salient tendency towards more opportunities for real choice and larger electoral bodies.But taken together opportunities for real choice remain scarce : in general party chairmen are not actually chosen by the formally empowered party organs; before formal elections are held choices are mostly made already! (shrink)