Chez les commentateurs platoniciens de l’époque impériale, l’un des problèmes majeurs liés à la théorie des Idées concernait le domaine d’application de cette doctrine. L’exégèse de la première partie du Parménide de Platon donnait occasion à diverses discussions sur ce sujet. Le Commentaire de Proclus sur le Parménide est sans doute la plus précieuse source qui soit parvenue de l’Antiquité jusqu’à nous pour la reconstitution de ces débats. Alors que la grande majorité des commentateurs anciens étaient convaincus que les Idées (...) ont un domaine assez restreint, le Commentaire de Proclus nous révèle l’existence d’une lecture alternative, selon laquelle il y a des Idées de « toutes choses ». Proclus relie cette interprétation alternative en particulier à l’existence des Idées de choses mauvaises et d’individus, probablement parce que ces deux classes d’objets étaient vraiment les dernières choses dont un platonicien orthodoxe voudrait admettre des Idées. Amélius est le seul néoplatonicien connu pour avoir soutenu l’existence des Idées de choses mauvaises. Dans cet article j’essaie de montrer que, selon toute vraisemblance, Amélius est également la cible de la réfutation des Idées d’individus par Proclus dans son Commentaire. La conclusion qui s’ensuit naturellement est qu’Amélius était très probablement l’un de ces philosophes qui, d’après Proclus, admettaient des Idées « de toutes choses ». (shrink)

In Proclus, like in Plato, we find statements about the Forms that at least appear to allow self-predication of Forms. In his discussion of the Parmenides’s Third Man Argument, however, Proclus argues that Forms and their participants are not synonymous, which means that the property that the Form causes in its participants cannot be predicated of the Form itself. In this paper, I try to show how such seemingly self-predicative statements about the Forms are to be understood in the context (...) of Proclus’ metaphysics. I will argue that, in Proclus, statements such as ‘ the Form of Large is truly Large’ should be considered what I will call ‘causal predications’. Causal predication does not attribute any property to a subject, but only concerns the subject’s causal efficacy in relation to that property. (shrink)

This paper analyses the central function that the Forms of Likeness and Unlikeness perform in the metaphysics of Proclus. Mainly drawing from Proclus’ Commentary on the Parmenides, the focus will be on the double role of these Forms as causes of the relations of likeness between different sensible particulars on the one hand and of the relations between sensible particulars and the Forms in which they partake on the other. It will be argued that the relations of likeness between sensible (...) particulars, while not identical to the corresponding relations between particulars and Forms, can nonetheless be related to the causal operation of the same Forms. One can therefore conclude that Proclus’ account of the causality of Likeness and Unlikeness – despite its complexity, which is partly due to the combination of exegetic and more systematic considerations – is consistent. (shrink)

Taking the recent publication of Sebastian Gertz’ translation of three late Platonic Introductions by Elias, David and Olympiodorus as a starting point, this review paper provides an assessment of Gertz’ translation and textual choices. In addition, it also provides an original contribution to the study of these texts by proposing an emendation of David’s text, and by discussing some of the source-texts of the three Introductions and of their parallels in the ancient commentary tradition. One case elaborated on in somewhat (...) greater detail concerns Olympiodorus’ arguments against scepticism. (shrink)

This paper provides a case study for the use of syllogistic reconstructions in the commentaries on Plato by the fifth-century commentator Proclus. The paper discusses Proclus’ reconstruction of the argument about the range of the Forms in Plato’s Parmenides (130b–e). In his commentary on this dialogue, Proclus reports a syllogistic reconstruction of the argument proposed by some of his predecessors. In this reconstruction, the argument as a whole is interpreted as a straightforward attack on the existence of Forms, while the (...) different premises of the hypothetical syllogism represent the respective positions of Parmenides and Socrates in the discussion. For Proclus, however, the argument about the range of Forms is not meant to be critical of the Forms, but rather provides a positive instruction about their range of application. I argue that while Proclus finds the syllogism a useful tool to reconstruct the different positions in the exegetical history of the argument, he does not accept it as an adequate reconstruction on his own account. The argument can be traced back most likely to the so-called ‘logical’ interpretations of the Parmenides that Proclus discusses – and dismisses – in the prologue to his commentary. (shrink)