This paper considers the connection between concepts, conceptual schemes and grammar in Wittgenstein’s last writings. It lists eight claims about concepts that one can garner from these writings. It then focuses on one of them, namely that there is an important difference between conceptual and factual problems and investigations. That claim draws in its wake other claims, all of them revolving around the idea of a conceptual scheme, what Wittgenstein calls a ‘grammar’. I explain why Wittgenstein’s account does not fall (...) prey to Davidson’s animadversions against the idea of a conceptual scheme as a force operating on a pre-conceptual content. In the sequel I deny that the distinction between grammatical and empirical propositions disappears in the last writings: it is neither deliberately abandoned, nor willy-nilly undermined by the admission of hinge propositions in On Certainty or by the role accorded to agreement in judgement. (shrink)
One of the problems confronting an interpretation of Husserl's late phenomenology is how to reconcile Husserl's increasing interest in the constitutive contribution of intersubjectivity with his introduction of the primordial reduction. How is it possible to characterize transcendental intersubjectivity as the foundation of truth and true being (Hua VIII 449, Hua IX 295, 344), and to claim simultanously that it is necessary to isolate the 'sphere of ownness' (that is, the primordial sphere encompassing everything which can be constituted by the (...) ego itself, without any contribution from another subjectivity (Hua I 124, Hua XVII 248)), so that one can gain a comprehension of the constituted Seinsgeltung of the Other (Hua XV 270-71)? In a sense, the answer is relatively straightforward. Husserl insists that the primordial reduction is undertaken for methodological reasons in order to elucidate the exact founded-founding relationship between subjective and intersubjective constitution. Thus, we are dealing with an attempt at a precise and appropriate introduction of the founded, but constituting transcendental intersubjectivity, and Husserl can consequently maintain that the thorough implementation of the transcendental reduction will ultimately lead us (if not sooner, then later) to a phenomenology of transcendental intersubjectivity (Hua I 69, Hua IX 245-246, Hua VIII 129, 176). The main problem with this answer is, however, that Husserl's strategy seems to remain vulnerable to a number of substantial objections. Let me, for the sake of simplicity, merely mention the two most fundamental ones. The first is general in nature and ultimately concerned with Husserl's theory of constitution. Thus, it might be asked whether Husserl's approach does not willy-nilly lead to a transcendental solipsism, insofar as it is impossible to preserve the equality and transcendence of the Other the moment one starts to regard it as founded and constituted.. (shrink)
The prescriptive force of methodological rules rests, I argue, on the acceptance of scientific theories; that of the most general methodological rules rests on theories in the philosophy of science, which differ from theories in the several sciences only in generality and abstraction. I illustrate these claims by reference to methodological disputes in social science and among philosophers of science. My conclusions substantiate those of Laudan except that I argue for the existence of transtheoretical goals common to all scientists and (...) concrete enough actually to have bearing on methodology. And I argue that Laudan is committed to such goals himself, willy nilly. (shrink)
This article presents current philosophical reflections on religious diversity and concomitant attitudes towards the interreligious situation. The motive behind this presentation is to show that in order to deal more efficiently with the phenomenon of religious plurality, there is a need for a development of the philosophy of religion, where new perspectives are opened up and explored. The very concept of religion as a belief system is put into question, since it has caused philosophical reflections on religious diversity to be (...) confined to certain metaphysical and epistemological concerns. Instead of focusing on the noun ‘religion’, the article suggests a way to understand the adjective ‘religious’ and view religious plurality as a plurality of ways of being religious. This opens up a certain context of interreligious relations and interreligious dialogue, where this very dialogue itself can contribute to the development of philosophical tools, concepts and categories for dealing with the fact of plurality. I call this context constructive dialogical pluralism. (shrink)
On the surface the concept of self-consciousness would seem to be understandable as consciousness of oneself. It is commonplace to resist this temptation by arguing that the self cannot properly be construed as the object of this form of consciousness. It is the subject. However, in this paper I show that any effort to see the self as the subject of consciousness converts it, willy nilly, into an object.Self-consciousness is not to be understood by determining the logically appropriate role (...) of the self in a univocal kind of consciousness. It differs from ‘ordinary’ consciousness because of the need for it to be unmediated and direct. If, on the one had, one is conscious of something, it is possible for that awareness to be indirect and mediated. On the other hand, if one is self-conscious it is necessary for that awareness to be direct. (shrink)
When developing phylogenetic systematics, the entomologist Willi Hennig adopted elements from Nicolai Hartmann’s ontology. In this historical essay I take on the task of documenting this adoption. I argue that in order to build a metaphysical foundation for phylogenetic systematics, Hennig adopted from Hartmann four main metaphysical theses. These are (1) that what is real is what is temporal; (2) that the criterion of individuality is to have duration; (3) that species are supra-individuals; and (4) that there are levels of (...) reality, each of which may be subject to different kinds of law. Reliance on Hartmann’s metaphysics allowed Hennig to ground some of the main theoretical principles of phylogenetic systematics, namely that the biological categories—from the semaphoront to the highest rank—have reality and individuality despite not being universals, and that they form a hierarchy of levels, each of which may require different kinds of explanation. Hartmann’s metaphysics thereby provided a philosophical justification for Hennig’s phylogenetic systematics, both as a theory and as a method of classification. (shrink)
I want to sound a warning note and suggest some changes that are needed in the practice of ethical review. It is easy to assume that with a policy as high-minded as the policy of reviewing research on human beings, the only difficulties will be the obstacles put in its way by recalcitrant and unreformed paries: by the special-interest groups affected. But this is not always true of high-minded policies and it is not true, in particular, of the policy of (...) reviewing research. Ethical review is endangering valuable research on human beings and, moreover, it is endangering the very ethic that is needed to govern that research. And this is not anyone's fault, least of all the fault of any special-interest groups. The problem is that the process of ethical review has been driven by an institutional dynamic that is not in anyone's control and this dynamic is now driving us, willy nilly, on to some very stony ground. My argument is developed in four sections. In the next section, section two, I look at a model of policy-making which identifies a reactive, institutional dynamic that lies at the origin of certain policy intitiatives. In the third section I argue that this model fits the appearance and development of the ethical review of human research, showing how the process of review has been motored by a dynamic of step-by-step reaction to chilling tales of abuse. In the fourth section I look at the predictions of the future development of ethical review that the extrapolation of that model yields. And then in the fifth and.. (shrink)
Educationalists are currently engaging with Jacques Rancière’s thought on emancipation and equality. The focus of this paper is on what initiates the process that starts emancipation. With reference to teachers the question is: how do teachers become emancipated? This paper discusses how the teacher’s life is made ‘sensible’ and how sense is distributed in her life. Two stories are taken from Rancière’s own work, that of Ingrid Bergman and Joseph Jacotot, that give us an indication of the initiation process of (...) emancipation. Then I will see this in relation to the teacher, Mr Briggs, who is one of the main characters of the play Our Day Out (1987) by Willy Russell. (shrink)
The feminine complaint that Alex's passion echoes, raising it to a level rarely attained, is not limited to the pursuit of sexual jouissance . Nor can it be reduced to an aversion on the part of women to a morality of the signifier, as maintained by a certain reading of Freud. Very precisely, the persistent note in feminine restlessness is a certain relationship of the subject to the insufficiency of the signifier, which the quest for love registers. The fact that (...) language lacks the very quality that would make it credible and that would guarantee that discourse corresponds to what desire attests to is what delivers femininity over to the unnameable. In love she requires from the other member of the social bond the signifier that is lacking within the structure of femininity and that causes the call to jouissance in her body that drives her to distraction. Thus, the structure at stake in femininity, to which Alex's hysterical passion bears witness, defines in writing, that is, by a mark left on the body, the limitation of the reality of a jouissance which persists beyond the signifier and the object of the fantasy. When the analyst's desire offers support to this quest for a limit to jouissance on the part of a subject, it is in desire that the reality of sex and the other is linked to the signifier that would testify to the truth of the amorous discourse in the unconscious. Thus from one man to another, from the love of the father to the loss of a son, including the desire of the lover and the law of the husband, a woman finds herself supporting, with the letter of her body, the signifier which in its words testifies to jouissance as a place to lose oneself. (shrink)
This article finds little to disagree with in Neurophilosophy The sole area of disagreement is with Professor Churchland's attitude to common?sense psychology. Unfortunately, though, the author has already attempted to describe what should be the proper view of common?sense psychology in an earlier article in this very journal. Therefore the present article tries to build on the earlier one, advocating an instrumentalist constraal of many ordinary?language mental terms ? a construal with which Professor Churchland is unlikely to agree, but which, (...) if she did agree, would give her further ammunition with which to beat her opponents. The other main strand of this article suggests that Aristotle has anticipated Professor Churchland (and also most other theoreticians of psychology and physiology), and so, willy?nilly, we are ? correctly ? returning to an Aristotelian picture of human capacity and activity. (shrink)
Plato noticed a sizeable problem apropos of establishing his republic—that there was always a ready pool of zealous potential rulers, lying in wait for a suitable opportunity to rule on their own tyrannical terms. He also recognized that those persons best suited to rule, those persons with foursquare and unimpeachable virtue, would be least motivated to govern. Ruling a polis meant that those persons, fully educated and in complete realization that the most complete happiness comprises solitary study of things unchanging, (...) would have to compromise their happiness for the wellbeing of their polis and of the people in it. Plato’s solution, in effect that the aristoi would merely recognize their duty to sacrifice personal happiness for the happiness of the polis, has perplexed and continues today to perplex scholars. Like Plato, Jefferson recognized that there was always a pool of eager sharks, ready to govern. His republicanism, comprising a ward system and general education, was founded on the fullest participation of its citizenry, suitably educated and a governing aristoi. The true aristoi, the “natural aristoi”, are the intelligent and virtuous and that government is best which allows for a “pure selection” of the natural aristoi into the governing offices. Nonetheless, as Jefferson’s own life shows, non-parochial governing meant being rent from domestic tranquility, being forced to leave behind one’s personal affairs to decay, and being tossed willy-nilly into the coliseum of nonstop political wrangling. Why would anyone, particularly one wanting to be happy, wish to govern? Thus, Jefferson faced the same problem that Plato faced. How could a state be structured so that the wisest and most virtuous would be motivated to rule? In this paper, I argue that Jefferson, in full recognition of the problem of encouraging the most intelligent and virtuous to govern, the problem of public service, offers a solution that is remarkably Platonic. (shrink)
It has become commonplace to ask, whenever anything has gone wrong, what lessons can be learned from the experience. But the appearance of open-endedness in that question is misleading: not every answer that we could give to it is acceptable. There are, in the context of such a question, tacit constraints in what counts as a valid lesson to be learned. The article considers what these constraints might be and the different kinds of lessons one might learn from experience, which (...) the common way of taking the question ignores. Initially I attempt to distinguish between lessons that have to do with action and those that have to do with understanding; between lessons that are about the results of our actions and those that are about the meaning of actions and events. On closer examination, however, these distinctions are seen to break down; to represent a difference of degree rather than of kind. In the latter part of the article, therefore, I find the crucial distinction to be between lessons that we can apply, while being ourselves unchanged, and lessons which, by changing the way in which we see and respond to people and events, re-constitute our selves and thus express themselves through us willy-nilly in our subsequent thoughts, words and actions. (shrink)
Kant’s notion of genius and the related idea of exemplary originality in the Critique of Judgment have been read by Paul Guyer and Timothy Gould as implying azero-sum game in which all creative artists are willy-nilly patricidal in relation to their predecessors and suicidal in relation to their successors. By way of challenging this interesting but ultimately repugnant reading, and especially its modernist and postmodernist frame of reference, this essay takes a close look at Kant’s sustained interest in the (...) monumental change of English garden design in the early eighteenth century and at the provocative implication of this hitherto generally overlooked interest for a radically different reading of Kant’s thoughts on the exemplary originality of genius. (shrink)
Willy Maley (1990). Undermining Archaeology. In Ian Bapty & Tim Yates (eds.), Archaeology After Structuralism: Post-Structuralism and the Practice of Archaeology. Routledge.score: 3.0
Machine generated contents note: Foreword: 'Taught by Love'--M.McQuillan * Notes on Contributors * Introduction: The Origins of Deconstruction: Derrida's Daughters--I.Willis * PROLOGUE * Jacques Derrida, 'Between the writing body and writing': An interview with Daniel Ferrer * Hlne Cixous, 'First of all (from the margins) I am a reader reading: An interview with Daniel Ferrer * PART I: INCUBATION * Dating-Deconstruction--M.Froment-Meurice * The Course of a General Displacement, or, The Course of the Choreographer--L.Turner * Feminine Endings: Didos Telephonic Body and (...) the Originary Function of the Hymen--I.Willis * On Prejudice and Foretelling 2--T.Docherty * Extremes Meet--J.M.Rabate * PART II: INAUGURATION * The Opening to Infinity: Derridas Quasi-Transcendentals--C.Colebrook * Splitting the Origin: Writing and Responsibility--M.Grebowicz * Derridean Beginning and Deleuzian Becoming--P.Patton * 'Words of Air': On Breath and Inspiration--C.Baracchi * PART III: INSTALLATION * Illegibility: On the Spirit of Origins--J.P.Leavey * Origins of Deconstruction? Deconstruction, That Which Arrives (If It Arrives)--J.Wolfreys * Philosophy of Cinders and Cinders of Philosophy: A Commentary on the Origins of Deconstruction and the Holocaust--R.Eaglestone * The Beginnings of Art: Heidegger and Bataille--G.Bucher * Aesthetic Allegory: Reading Hegel after Bernal--M.McQuillan * Notes * Index Foreword: 'Taught by Love'--M.McQuillan * Notes on Contributors * Introduction: The Origins of Deconstruction: Derrida's Daughters--I.Willis * PROLOGUE * Jacques Derrida, 'Between the writing body and writing': An interview with Daniel Ferrer * Hlne Cixous, 'First of all (from the margins) I am a reader reading: An interview with Daniel Ferrer * PART I: INCUBATION * Dating-Deconstruction--M.Froment-Meurice * The Course of a General Displacement, or, The Course of the Choreographer--L.Turner * Feminine Endings: Didos Telephonic Body and the Originary Function of the Hymen--I.Willis * On Prejudice and Foretelling 2--T.Docherty * Extremes Meet--J.M.Rabate * PART II: INAUGURATION * The Opening to Infinity: Derridas Quasi-Transcendentals--C.Colebrook * Splitting the Origin: Writing and Responsibility--M.Grebowicz * Derridean Beginning and Deleuzian Becoming--P.Patton * 'Words of Air': On Breath and Inspiration--C.Baracchi * PART III: INSTALLATION * Illegibility: On the Spirit of Origins--J.P.Leavey * Origins of Deconstruction? Deconstruction, That Which Arrives (If It Arrives)--J.Wolfreys * Philosophy of Cinders and Cinders of Philosophy: A Commentary on the Origins of Deconstruction and the Holocaust--R.Eaglestone * The Beginnings of Art: Heidegger and Bataille--G.Bucher * Aesthetic Allegory: Reading Hegel after Bernal--M.McQuillan * Notes * Index. (shrink)
Willie Thompson offers a clear, jargon-free introduction to postmodernist theory and its significant impact on the study of history. This is a hotly-debated topic, and much of the literature is both polemical and inaccessible to the novice. Thompson, however, presents key ideas in a straightforward way, making these debates relevant to students' own work.
Managers often encounter situations that require them to make decisions with ethical implications that affect the organization as well as the managers themselves. The issue we address in this study concerns whether the ethical consistency of managerial decisions is situation dependent. That is, are the decisions managers make ethically consistent when they are faced with different ethical situations? We hypothesize that managerial decisions will vary depending on the type of ethical situation they encounter. We also hypothesize that gender plays a (...) role in determining the ethical consistency of managerial decisions. Results of statistical analyses support our hypotheses. (shrink)
The fields of environmental ethics and of religion and ecology have been shaped by Lynn White Jr.'s thesis that the roots of ecological crisis lie in religious cosmology. Independent critical movements in both fields, however, now question this methodological legacy and argue for alternative ways of inquiry. For religious ethics, the twin controversies cast doubt on prevailing ways of connecting environmental problems to religious deliberations because the criticisms raise questions about what counts as an environmental problem, how religious traditions change, (...) and whether ethicists should approach problems and traditions with reformist commitments. This article examines the critiques of White's legacy and presents a pluralist alternative that focuses religious ethics on the contextual strategies produced by moral communities as they confront environmental problems. (shrink)
Darwin offered an intriguing answer to the species problem. He doubted the existence of the species category as a real category in nature, but he did not doubt the existence of those taxa called ‘‘species’’. And despite his scepticism of the species category, Darwin continued using the word ‘‘species’’. Many have said that Darwin did not understand the nature of species. Yet his answer to the species problem is both theoretically sound and practical. On the theoretical side, DarwinÕs answer is (...) confirmed by contemporary biology, and it offers a more satisfactory answer to the species problem than recent attempts to save the species category. On the practical side, DarwinÕs answer frees us from the search for the correct theoretical definition of ‘‘species’’. But at the same time it does not require that we banish the word ‘‘species’’ from biology as some recent sceptics of the species category advocate. Ó The Willi Hennig Society 2010. (shrink)
