The House of Fame, a parody of the cosmological epic, expresses Chaucer's doubts about the representation of reality as a system penetrable to its depths by human understanding. Specifically, the poem mimics works of Martianus Capella, Bernard Silvestris, Alain de Lille, and to a lesser extent, Dante. I call this group of writers the Liberal Arts Cult, because, posing reality as a Neoplatonic system with certain magical and gnostic features, they propose to perfect the human soul by instilling in it (...) a knowledge of the seven liberal arts. ;The title-image, "a windmill under a walnut shell," comes from Book 3, where Geoffrey sees Colle Tregetour playing the shell-game, not with the conventional pea, but with a windmill, an image of the cosmos known to Chaucer through Dante and the Arab astronomers. This cosmic legerdemain represents a common trick of intellection: the illusion of broadened understanding achieved by narrowing perspective. Colle's trick symbolizes the basic feat that epics of the Liberal Arts Cult, with other magic systems, play by reducing the world's mysteries to manipulable quantities. The common excess of these writers amounts to elevating their special knowledge to magical potency, an action that puts them out of touch with a basic fact of existence seldom far from Chaucer's consciousness. It is the sheer structural subordination of human creativity to the divine Logos; as Erich Voegelin describes it: "The word of man, when he articulates his consciousness of reality, emerges from the reality that is the word of God." ;Questions of style merge with philosophical concerns as the House of Fame meditates on the literary representation of reality. The main problem and the point from which Chaucer diverges farthest from the Cultist's epics involves their histrionic personifications of philosophical concepts, especially phronesis, defined by Aristotle as the "virtue of deliberation about what is good and useful for man." The House of Fame is Chaucer's first major effort to restore this cognitive activity to its human scope both by representing it as the commonest action of his characters and by demanding it of his readers. (shrink)

This study of American intellectual histories sketches their development from colonial chronicles to today's professional scholarship. It concentrates upon the writings of a dozen or more major historians between the late 1800's and the middle 1900's who have contributed to the study of the history of ideas in America, including Moses Coit Tyler, Edward Eggleston, Charles Beard, Carl Becker, Vernon Farrington, Merle Curti, Perry Miller, and Ralph Gabriel. The various histories are analyzed partly from the perspective of a developing scholarly (...) discipline and partly from the perspective of the "climate of opinion" in which the histories were written. The methods employed by the historians in studying ideas, as well as the substantive interpretations expressed in the histories, are analyzed in relation to the "world-views" or "ideological positions" of the historians themselves. Originally published in 1966. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905. (shrink)

Close analysis of the relevant theories of Russell and Whitehead leads in both cases to the conclusion that a crucial distinction between sensed events and physical events is implicit; if this is so, a bifurcation is also implicit. ;Lastly, the analyses of Russell and Whitehead are brought directly to bear on the special theory of relativity. It is concluded that this theory is still best understood on the dualistic epistemological basis that Einstein recommends. In closing the generalization of this thesis (...) is again urged; namely, that a dualistic epistemology is inherent in deductive sciences, and in normally reflective common sense. ;This essay turns on the work of Albert Einstein. His ideas are first studied from a "positivistic" point of view; that is, on the assumption that nature-as-conceived is somehow reducible to nature-as-perceived. But a closer look at some of his writings indicate that he came to hold a "bifurcation" epistemology; that is, the view that nature-as-perceived must be explained in terms of nature unperceived. It is argued that such a dualistic epistemology is inherent in science, at least since Galileo, and probably inherent in common sense. Einstein's explicit bifurcation-theory is then reviewed, and the special theory of relativity exhibited as a model application thereof. However, Einstein apparently begins from an assumption that enduring objects are the basic substances of the world, while one outcome of the theory of relativity is the suggestion that events play that role. Hence the study turns to Russell and Whitehead; in certain periods both employ an event-ontology, and both seek to avoid "bifurcation.". (shrink)

Several ethical and political theories favor the satisfaction of self-regarding desires. Desire theories of welfare say that their satisfaction creates welfare. Liberalism says that the state must allow the satisfaction of these desires. This pro-desire stance is plausible because the goal of satisfying self-regarding desires seems attractive. A challenge for pro-desire theories is that the satisfaction of certain self-regarding desires is not attractive. These desires seem to be in some sense "alien" to the self. Examples are desires associated with addictions, (...) psychological compulsions, and psychological conditioning. Their satisfaction does not seem to be an attractive goal, yet pro-desire theories seem committed to favoring their satisfaction. I examine analyses of alien desires suggested by the literature and argue that none of them provides an adequate solution to this problem. I suggest that alien desires are desires that would be rational if the person believed something that in fact she believes is false. Such desires could be produced by a mental representation--other than a belief--with a content that conflicted with the content of one's beliefs. It turns out that we must postulate belief-like mental representations, or quasi-beliefs, to explain important empirical facts about our behavior. Alien desires involve quasi-beliefs with contents that conflict with the contents of beliefs. This theory provides the distinction between alien and authentic desires that pro-desire theories need. (shrink)

This article presents the results of a cross-cultural study that examines the relationship between spirituality and a consumer’s ethical predisposition, and further examines the relationship between the internalization of one’s moral identity and a consumer’s ethical predisposition. Finally, the moderating impact of cultural factors on the above relationships is tested using Hofstede’s five dimensions. Data were gathered from young adult, well-educated consumers in five different countries, namely the U.S., France, Spain, India, and Egypt. The results indicate that the more spiritual (...) an individual consumer is, the more likely that consumer is to be ethically predisposed. Furthermore, the stronger one’s internalization of a moral identity, the more likely one is to be ethically predisposed. These two relationships are further moderated by Hofstede’s cultural factors such as the degree of collectivism versus individualism in the culture. However, the strength and direction of the moderation may vary depending upon the specific Hofstede dimension. (shrink)

As business takes on an increasingly important role in many modern societies, stakeholder theory has become a central theme in the literature on business ethics/business & society. There are, however, a number of theoretical problems with stakeholder theory as currently understood. Among these are: the lack of a coherent justificatory framework and the problem of stakeholder identification. In this essay, I propose that a possible source of obligations to stakeholders is the principle of stakeholder fairness as discussed in the political (...) philosophic literature of Rawls, Simmons, and Cullity among others. From Rawls's work, a principle of stakeholder fairness is derived. That is, ;The principle of stakeholder fairness. Whenever persons or groups of persons voluntarily accept the benefits of a mutually beneficial scheme of co-operation requiring sacrifice or contribution on the parts of the participants and there exists the possibility of free-riding, obligations of fairness are created among the participants in the co-operative scheme in proportion to the benefits accepted. ;By way of defending and explicating a fairness-based stakeholder theory, the project is laid out as follows: Chapter One provides an overview of the essay, Chapter Two argues for the need for organizational-level moral theory, Chapter Three describes and critiques the current state of the art in stakeholder theory and a number of conceptual gaps in the current stakeholder literature, Chapter Four discusses Rawls's principle of fair play and the derivative principle of stakeholder fairness as well as comparing and contrasting the fairness model with other similar models of business ethics, Chapter Five elaborates on a discursive method for testing the content of stakeholder norms. Chapter Six provides an in depth discussion of the problem of stakeholder identity and the determination of legitimate moral stakeholder status, and Chapter Seven suggests some ways in which stakeholder theory may be enriched through considerations of the social psychological studies of justice, fairness, and equity and provides some preliminary propositions for future empirical testing. (shrink)

In this dissertation, I argue that John Stuart Mill does not defend a classical liberal, Lockean idea of liberty as freedom from coercion, especially governmental coercion. Rather, I argue that Mill has something much more radical in mind: for Mill, liberty requires freedom from the much broader idea of "the moral coercion of public opinion." ;Mill's so-called "harm principle," which is at the root of his defense of liberty, is often common-sensically interpreted according to what I term the political interpretation (...) of the harm principle. On the political interpretation the harm principle is intended to restrict the use of coercion, especially governmental coercion. On the political interpretation the harm principle is intended to draw a line between those areas of life that are subject to moral sanctions, and those that are subject to the law. All the mechanisms of moral suasion, including even boycotting, excommunication and shunning, are available to the moral realm; but when one's actions harm another, they become subject to legal punishment. ;In contrast to the political interpretation, I urge an interpretation I call the social interpretation of the harm principle. According to the social interpretation, the harm principle is intended to restrict expressions of disapproval, such as boycotting or blacklisting. According to the social interpretation, the harm principle rules out any such notion as private morality/immorality: for something to be considered immoral, it must harm others. (shrink)

As Calvino, points out in the Lezioni americane, the gift of our natural languages seems to be their capacity to reflect a world that is multiple and complex, the ability to comprehend its mobility, its constant deformation. To that end, then, this study concentrates on the question of epistemology, or how we come to know and give order to phenomena without eliminating or reducing their multiplicity. My readings focus on three specific moments in the process of coming to know. In (...) the first chapter, I trace out the loss of he loss of a stable and coherent origin of phenomena, and the discovery in its place of either an absence of origin , or a plurality of shifting, mobile causes . In the second chapter, I examine the heart of the question: how can the epistemic subject give order to chaotic phenomena without reducing their complexity? Indeed, both Calvino seem to keenly feel the attraction to a sharp geometry of thought---however, both ultimately resort to the notion of the provisional structure, a cognitive bricolage, that orders without guaranteeing the permanence of that order---an idea that notably resonates with much post-structuralist thinking, particular that of Jacques Derrida. Lastly, I turn to the question of endings, examining in particular the critical anxiety that surrounds the incompleteness of Gadda's writing. Gadda's inability to finish his novels is almost invariably ascribed to a lack in the author, despite the fact that the interminability of cognitive systems is fundamental to his philosophical writings. With Calvino, on the other hand, I trace the historical development of the ending from an initial closure that treats literature as the nostalgic 'other' of the real world to the open endings typical of his later, combinatorial work. (shrink)

Illusionism treats the almost universally held belief in our ability to make free choices as an erroneous, though beneficent, idea. According to this view, it is sadly true, though virtually impossible to believe, that none of a person’s choices are avoidable and ‘up to him’: any claim to the effect that they are being naïveté or, in the case of those who know better, pretense. Indeed, the implications of this skepticism are so disturbing, pace Spinoza, that it must not be (...) allowed to see the light of intellectual day, confined to the nether regions of consciousness. Even those who have ‘done the philosophy’ and disabused themselves here should nevertheless (somehow) continue believing in free will, lest they come to regard our lives as meaningless, spreading despair and social upheaval. Thus, the “Illusionists” who propound this view are themselves circumspect in doing so. -/- But is escaping the (putative) truth really possible here? Could a disabused philosopher ever return to something like his former intellectual innocence? Self-deception may not be possible; but would an attempt at it reveal anything significant about choice formation? If one were to try to regain one’s illusion, what would one realize? I shall argue here that one would reflectively discover precisely the opposite of what the Illusionists contend- that there are indeed free choices. Let us begin by considering the inconsistency that supposedly entails the illusion of free will. (shrink)

Drawing on Aristotle’s notion of “ultimate responsibility,” Robert Kane argues that to be exercising a free will an agent must have taken some character forming decisions for which there were no sufficient conditions or decisive reasons.¹ That is, an agent whose will is free not only had the ability to develop other dispositions, but could have exercised that ability without being irrational. To say it again, a person has a free will just in case her character is the product (...) of decisions that she could have rationally avoided making. That one’s character is the product of such decisions entails ultimate responsibility for its manifestations, engendering a free will. (shrink)

The authors articulate a global public standard for the normative legitimacy of global governance institutions. This standard can provide the basis for principled criticism of global governance institutions and guide reform efforts in circumstances in which people disagree deeply about the demands of global justice and the role that global governance institutions should play in meeting them.

Preventive use of force may be defined as the initiation of military action in anticipation of harmful actions that are neither presently occurring nor imminent. This essay explores the permissibility of preventive war from a cosmopolitan normative perspective, one that recognizes the basic human rights of all persons, not just citizens of a particular country or countries. It argues that preventive war can only be justified if it is undertaken within an appropriate rule-governed, institutional framework that is designed to help (...) protect vulnerable countries against unjustified interventions while also avoiding unacceptable risks of the costs of inaction. The key to ensuring the fairness of rules governing the preventive use of force is accountability.This essay proposes a scheme that would make those promoting and those rejecting the preventive use of force more accountable. The proposal contains the following crucial features:States proposing preventive war are required to enter into a contract with a diverse body of states as a condition for authorization of their actions;Prior to taking preventive action, states must make an evidence-based case to the UN Security Council, and agree in advance to submit themselves to an evaluation by an impartial body after the preventive action occurred;Both proponents of action and those opposing it will be held accountable ex post for the accuracy of their prior statements and the proportionality of their actions;Sanctions will be imposed against intervening states or states that opposed preventive action, respectively, depending on the findings of the ex post evaluation.If preventive action were blocked in the Security Council, states seeking to engage in preventive action could then present their case in a different body–a coalition of democratic states–with its own ex post and ex ante accountability procedures. (shrink)

Drawing on Aristotle’s notion of “ultimate responsibility,” Robert Kane argues that to be exercising a free will an agent must have taken some character forming decisions for which there were no sufficient conditions or decisive reasons. That is, an agent whose will is free not only had the ability to develop values and beliefs besides those that presently make up her motives, but could have exercised that ability without being irrational. An agent wills freely, on this view, by beingultimately (...) responsible for how she is currently disposed to act. Kane needs, then, to show how an agent could be responsible for decisions that her deliberations did not guarantee. He must also explain how a decision for which there is no decisive reason could yet be rational, assuming that the responsibility engendering decisions forming the basis of a free will would be rational. I shall argue here that Kane has achieved neither of these goals. (shrink)

Kant was one of the inventors of anthropology, and his lectures on anthropology were the most popular and among the most frequently given of his lecture courses. This volume contains the first translation of selections from student transcriptions of the lectures between 1772 and 1789, prior to the published version, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, which Kant edited himself at the end of his teaching career. The two most extensive texts, Anthropology Friedländer and Anthropology Mrongovius, are presented here (...) in their entirety, along with selections from all the other lecture transcriptions published in the Academy edition, together with sizeable portions of the Menschenkunde, first published in 1831. These lectures show that Kant had a coherent and well-developed empirical theory of human nature bearing on many other aspects of his philosophy, including cognition, moral psychology, politics and philosophy of history. (shrink)

Infertility is recognized as a major problem of modern society. Assisted Reproductive Technology is the one of many available treatment options to cure infertility. However, the efficiency of the ART treatment is still inadequate. Therefore, the procedure’s quality is constantly improving and there is a need to determine statistical predictors as well as contributing factors to the successful treatment. There is a concern over the application of adequate statistical analysis to clinical data: should classic statistical methods be used or would (...) it be more appropriate to apply advanced data mining technologies? By comparing two statistical models, Multivariable Logistic Regression analysis and Artificial Neural Network it has been demonstrated that Multivariable Logistic Regression analysis is more suitable for theoretical interest but the Artificial Neural Network method is more useful in clinical prediction. (shrink)

Many philosophers believe that there is a causal condition on perception, and that this condition is a conceptual truth about perception. A highly influential argument for this claim is based on intuitive responses to Gricean-style thought experiments. Do the folk share the intuitions of philosophers? Roberts et al. (2016) presented participants with two kinds of cases: Blocker cases (similar to Grice’s case involving a mirror and a pillar) and Non-Blocker cases (similar to Grice’s case involving a clock and brain stimulation). (...) They found that a substantial minority agreed that seeing occurs in the Non-Blocker cases, and that in the Blocker cases significantly less agreed that seeing occurs. They thus hypothesized that folk intuitions better align with a no blocker condition than with a causal condition. This paper continues this line of enquiry with two new experiments. The paper investigates the generality and robustness of Roberts et al.’s findings by expanding the sense modalities tested from only vision to audition and olfaction as well. The paper also uses Gricean-style thought experiments as a case study for investigating the “reflection defense” against the negative project in experimental philosophy. Our results replicate and extend Roberts et al.’s study and support their hypothesis that folk intuitions better align with a no blocker condition. They also provide an empirical reason to doubt the reflection defense. (shrink)