People have disagreed on the significance of Libet-style experiments for discussions about free will. In what specifically concerns free will in a libertarian sense, some argue that Libet-style experiments pose a threat to its existence by providing support to the claim that decisions are determined by unconscious brain events. Others disagree by claiming that determinism, in a sense that conflicts with libertarian free will, cannot be established by sciences other than fundamental physics. This paper rejects both positions. First, it is (...) argued that neuroscience and psychology could in principle provide support for milder deterministic claims that would also conflict with libertarian free will. Second, it is argued that Libet-style experiments—due to some of their peculiar features, ones that need not be shared by neuroscience as a whole—currently do not support such less demanding deterministic claims. The general result is that neuroscience and psychology could in principle... (shrink)

Derk Pereboom and Gregg Caruso argue that humans are never morally responsible for their actions and take that thesis as a starting point for a project whose ultimate goal is the reform of responsibility practices, which include expressions of praise, blame, and the institution of legal punishment. This paper shares the skeptical concern that current responsibility practices can be suboptimal and in need of change, but argues that a non-skeptical pursuit of those changes is viable and more promising. The main (...) lines of the argument are developed by assessing the prospects of implementing one of the changes favored within the skeptical project (namely, the reduction of punishment severity) in light of how human moral psychology works. An original vignette experiment (N = 180; participants from Facebook groups related to Brazilian universities) asked participants to recommend sentences for a fictitious criminal after considering alternatives to regular punishment that varied in their effectiveness to prevent reoffending. The results suggest that people can become less punitive even if they continue to believe in moral responsibility and free will. The paper further argues that reforming responsibility practices is more likely to occur without the endorsement of skepticism. (shrink)

In a previous paper, I argued that neuroscience and psychology could in principle undermine libertarian free will by providing support for a subset of what I called “statements of local determination.” I also argued that Libet-style experiments have not so far supported statements of that sort. In a commentary to the paper, Adina Roskies and Eddy Nahmias accept the claim about Libet-style experiments, but reject the claim about the possibilities of neuroscience. Here, I explain why I still disagree with their (...) conclusion, despite being sympathetic to a lot of what they say in support of it. (shrink)

Free will skepticism is the view that people never truly deserve to be praised, blamed, or punished for what they do. One challenge free will skeptics face is to explain how criminality could be dealt with given their skepticism. This paper critically examines the prospects of implementing legal changes concerning crime and punishment derived from the free will skeptical views developed by Derk Pereboom and Gregg Caruso. One central aspect of the changes their views require is a concern for reducing (...) the severity of current forms of punishment. The paper considers two strategies for pursuing such a reduction. By taking into account evidence from the psychology of belief in free will and desire to punish, it is argued that a strategy aiming at a reduction of people’s natural desire to punish criminals can be successful if capable of providing alternatives to current forms of punishment satisfying three properties: they must be less harmful than current forms of punishment, more effective in preventing crime, and incompatible with current forms of punishment. (shrink)

Judging a person as morally responsible involves believing that certain responses (such as punishment, reward, or expressions of blame or praise) can be justifiably directed at the person. This paper develops an account of the evolution of moral responsibility judgment that adopts Michael Tomasello’s two-step theory of the evolution of morality and borrows also from Christopher Boehm’s work. The main hypothesis defended is that moral responsibility judgment originally evolved as an adaptation that enabled groups of cooperative individuals to hold free (...) riders responsible more safely by acting in a coordinated way. (shrink)

Derk Pereboom and Gregg Caruso argue that humans are never morally responsible for their actions and take that thesis as a starting point for a project whose ultimate goal is the reform of responsibility practices, which include expressions of praise, blame, and the institution of legal punishment. This paper shares the skeptical concern that current responsibility practices can be suboptimal and in need of change, but argues that a non-skeptical pursuit of those changes is viable and more promising. The main (...) lines of the argument are developed by assessing the prospects of implementing one of the changes favored within the skeptical project (namely, the reduction of punishment severity) in light of how human moral psychology works. An original vignette experiment (N = 180; participants from Facebook groups related to Brazilian universities) asked participants to recommend sentences for a fictitious criminal after considering alternatives to regular punishment that varied in their effectiveness to prevent reoffending. The results suggest that people can become less punitive even if they continue to believe in moral responsibility and free will. The paper further argues that reforming responsibility practices is more likely to occur without the endorsement of skepticism. (shrink)

This paper focuses on Gilberto Gomes’ work on free will. In a series of contributions that have had a significant impact on the respective literature, Gomes developed a conception about free will and argued that its existence is consistent with recent scientific findings, specially in neuroscience. In this paper, I object to a claim of Gomes about his conception of free will, namely the claim that it is a compatibilist conception. I seek to show that Gomes does not use the (...) term ‘compatibilism’ as it is usual in the contemporary literature on free will, i.e., as the thesis that free will can exist even if determinism is true. Moreover, the conception of free will Gomes proposes actually has an incompatibilist commitment. I argue that, more than a mere terminological point, acknowledging the incompatibilist aspect of Gomes’ view motivates important questions about the details of the view and helps to reveal a limitation of his defense of the existence of free will. [Este artigo tem como tema o trabalho de Gilberto Gomes sobre o livre-arbítrio. Em uma série de contribuições que tiveram um impacto significativo na respectiva literatura, Gomes elaborou uma concepção sobre o livre-arbítrio e argumentou que sua existência é consistente com descobertas científicas recentes, especialmente na neurociência. Neste artigo, questiono uma afirmação de Gomes sobre sua concepção sobre o livre-arbítrio, a saber, que se trata de uma concepção compatibilista. Busco mostrar que Gomes não usa o termo ‘compatibilismo’ como é habitual na literatura contemporânea sobre o livre-arbítrio, isto é, como a tese segundo a qual o livre-arbítrio pode existir ainda que o determinismo seja verdadeiro. Ademais, a concepção sobre o livre-arbítrio desenvolvida por Gomes tem, efetivamente, um compromisso incompatibilista. Argumento que, mais do que uma mera elucidação terminológica, reconhecer o elemento incompatibilista presente na proposta de Gomes suscita questões importantes sobre os detalhes da proposta e também ajuda a reconhecer uma limitação de sua defesa da existência do livre-arbítrio.]. (shrink)

In the last few decades, the literature on moral responsibility has been increasingly populated by scientific studies. Studies in neuroscience and psychology, in particular, have been claimed to be relevant for discussions about moral responsibility in a number of ways. And at the same time, there is not yet a systematic understanding of the sort of questions a science of moral responsibility is supposed to answer. This paper is an attempt to move toward such an understanding. I discuss three models (...) for framing scientific questions relevant to an investigation of moral responsibility. The favored model—the Enhancement model—proposes that a science of moral responsibility has two descriptive tasks. First, science can describe the causes and effects of the many sorts of responses that constitute the human practices of moral responsibility, such as praise, blame, and punishment. And, second, science can describe how modifications aiming at the improvement of such practices can be achieved. Relatively to the other models to be considered, the Enhancement model is broader in scope and less tied to the traditional philosophical agenda on moral responsibility. (shrink)

Resumo: Em décadas recentes, a investigação filosófica sobre a responsabilidade moral e o livre-arbítrio, que por muito tempo foi vista como um empreendimento principalmente teórico, passou a também incluir preocupações de tipo mais prático. Essa mudança é bem ilustrada pela proposta cética desenvolvida por autores como Derk Pereboom e Gregg Caruso. Seus trabalhos não apenas negam que sejamos agentes livres e moralmente responsáveis (em um sentido específico dos termos em questão), mas também defendem reformas na maneira como a responsabilização é (...) efetivada em nossas relações interpessoais e, especialmente, no sistema penal. Este artigo examina as implicações práticas do ceticismo de Pereboom e Caruso, principalmente no que diz respeito à sua implementabilidade. Argumento que o núcleo propriamente cético da proposta é inviável para seres humanos com a psicologia moral que temos, mas que, apesar disso, alguns elementos da proposta são compatíveis com uma proposta não-cética focada no aperfeiçoamento das práticas punitivas. Abstract: In recent decades, the philosophical investigation of moral responsibility and free will, which for a long time was seen as a mostly theoretical enterprise, became also the place of more practically oriented concerns. The skeptical view developed by Derk Pereboom and Gregg Caruso is a good illustration of the change. In their work, they not just deny that we are free and morally responsible agents (in a specific sense of the relevant terms) but also propose the reform of responsibility practices as they figure in our interpersonal relations and, especially, in the criminal justice system. This paper examines the practical implications of Pereboom and Caruso’s skepticism, particularly in what concerns its likelihood of being implemented. I argue that the strictly skeptical core of their proposal is not viable for human beings with a moral psychology like ours, but that some elements are nonetheless consistent with a non-skeptical view focused on the improvement of punitive practices. (shrink)

Este artigo reconstrói os argumentos de Donald Davidson (1970) em favor de sua teoria do monismo anômalo e revisa as principais críticas que recebeu. Essa teoria é amplamente rejeitada atualmente e, dadas as inúmeras críticas recebidas, é razoável concluir que qualquer tentativa de reabilitação tem um longo caminho pela frente. A diversidade dessas críticas sugere que não há consenso sobre por que exatamente o monismo anômalo fracassa, embora as dificuldades pareçam convergir sobre a justificação e possibilidade da tese monista, e (...) não sobre a anomalia do mental. (shrink)

Diana Pérez (2005) criticizes Davidson’s argument for the thesis that there is no thought without language, and offers an alternative defense of that thesis on the basis of empirical studies on developmental psychology. In this comment I argue that more recent studies do not seem to affect Davidson’s argument in the way Pérez suggests, and that her alternative defense of the thesis that there is no thought without language is insufficient. At the end, I offer a sketch of how a (...) weaker and more tenable version of the argument could be articulated. (shrink)

Tradução de correspondências trocadas entre Descartes e Elisabeth no ano de 1643, nas quais discutem a tese cartesiana da alma como imaterial e inextensa.

Donald Davidson’s anomalous monism has been repeatedly criticized since its initial defense in the paper Mental Events, which was published in 1970. Despite the widespread rejection, there seems to be no agreement on why anomalous monism fails. This paper systematizes two strong objections to anomalous monism. First, Davidson’s argument for monism requires the problematic assumption that physics can provide strict causal laws for causal relations in general. Second, Davidson’s monism requires an ontology of events for which no satisfactory criterion of (...) identity has been provided. Despite these problems, the paper argues that the theses on the anomalism and irreducibility of the mental remain acceptable, despite the difficulty of reconstructing precisely the arguments Davidson uses to defend them. (shrink)

[Note: articles 1-5 are in English; Intro, Discussion, and Conclusion are in Portuguese.] Responsibility practices that are part of our daily lives involve, among other things, standards about how one should praise, blame, or punish people for their actions, as well as particular acts that follow those standards to a greater or lesser extent. A classical question in philosophy asks whether human beings can actually be morally responsible for what they do. This dissertation argues that addressing this classical question is (...) insufficient if one wants the investigation of moral responsibility to serve the goal of improving ordinary responsibility practices. As an alternative, I offer directions for an interdisciplinary investigation that I take to be in a better position to promote that goal. My argument is developed in five articles and a discussion section. The first four articles describe limitations of skeptical views, which deny the existence of moral responsibility. The first article assesses a skeptical argument based on results from neuroscience that intends to show that there is no free will. I argue that a premise in the argument—which says that choices are determined by events in the brain—is not supported by the available results. The second article argues that, despite the fact that existent results do not show that choices are determined by brain events, further studies in neuroscience could in principle do that. The third article begins the discussion of limitations that concern the implementability of some of the changes in responsibility practices recommended in skeptical approaches. Specifically, I describe challenges that attempts to reduce the severity of legal punishment are likely to face due to psychological facts about belief in free will and desire to punish. The forth article presents results from an original experiment that sought to test a hypothesis about the workings of belief in free will and the desire to punish, namely the hypothesis that the desire to punish causally affects beliefs about free will. Results failed to support the hypothesis. Finally, the fifth article presents what I call the enhancement model, i.e., a proposal about how to structure an interdisciplinary investigation that can promote the enhancement of ordinary responsibility practices. The final discussion section shows how the enhancement model overcomes some of the limitations of recent discussions about the existence of moral responsibility, which includes not just the skeptical views considered in earlier articles, but also views that affirm the existence of moral responsibility and free will. The central claim of this dissertation, therefore, is that the investigation of moral responsibility can be rearranged so as to further the goal of improving ordinary responsibility practices. (shrink)

Diana Pérez criticizes Davidson’s argument for the thesis that there is no thought without language, and offers an alternative defense of that thesis on the basis of empirical studies on developmental psychology. In this comment I argue that more recent studies do not seem to affect Davidson’s argument in the way Pérez suggests, and that her alternative defense of the thesis that there is no thought without language is insufficient. At the end, I offer a sketch of how a weaker (...) and more tenable version of the argument could be articulated. (shrink)

Qual é a relação entre uma razão e uma ação quando a razão explica a ação, dando a razão do agente para fazer o que fez? Podemos chamar tais explicações de racionalizações, e dizer que a razão racionaliza a ação. Neste artigo quero defender a posição antiga — e de senso comum — de que a racionalização é uma espécie de explicação causal b. A defesa sem dúvida exige alguma reelaboração, mas não parece necessário abandonar a posição, como muitos autores (...) recentes insistem. (shrink)

Esta coletânea explora o papel desempenhado pelas emoções na teorização em ética e metaética. Inclui capítulos escritos por pesquisadores do Brasil e de outros países.

Marcelo Fischborn discusses the significance of neuroscience for debates about free will. Although he concedes that, to date, Libet-style experiments have failed to threaten “libertarian free will”, he argues that, in principle, neuroscience and psychology could do so by supporting local determinism. We argue that, in principle, Libet-style experiments cannot succeed in disproving or even establishing serious doubt about libertarian free will. First, we contend that “local determination”, as Fischborn outlines it, is not a coherent concept. Moreover, (...) determinism is unlikely to be established by neuroscience in any form that should trouble compatibilists or libertarians—that is, anyone who thinks we might have free will. We conclude that, in principle, neuroscience will not be able undermine libertarian free will and explain why these conclusions support a coherent compatibilist notion of causal sourcehood. (shrink)

While agreeing with Fischborn’s (2018) contention that, according to one traditional definition of compatibilism, my position should be classified as that of a libertarian incompatibilist, I argue here for a different view of compatibilism. This view involves, on the one hand, local probabilistic causation of decisions (rather than universal strict determinism) and, on the other, free will conceived as involving decisions generated by a decision-making process carried out by the brain, which consciously contemplates different alternatives and could in principle (...) have been different from what it was, implying that the agent could in normal conditions have done otherwise in the same circumstances. After discussing different views of causation (including determinism) and of free will, I make a revision of some passages from my earlier work, quoted by Fischborn. I conclude that what is crucial in the question of (in)compatibilism is the (in)compatibility between freedom of decisions and natural causation of human actions. According to this looser and, I argue, more pertinent view of compatibilism, I maintain my previous classification of my position on the matter as compatibilist. (shrink)

While agreeing with Fischborn’s (2018) contention that, according to one traditional definition of compatibilism, my position should be classified as that of a libertarian incompatibilist, I argue here for a different view of compatibilism. This view involves, on the one hand, local probabilistic causation of decisions (rather than universal strict determinism) and, on the other, free will conceived as involving decisions generated by a decision-making process carried out by the brain, which consciously contemplates different alternatives and could in principle (...) have been different from what it was, implying that the agent could in normal conditions have done otherwise in the same circumstances. After discussing different views of causation (including determinism) and of free will, I make a revision of some passages from my earlier work, quoted by Fischborn. I conclude that what is crucial in the question of (in)compatibilism is the (in)compatibility between freedom of decisions and natural causation of human actions. According to this looser and, I argue, more pertinent view of compatibilism, I maintain my previous classification of my position on the matter as compatibilist. (shrink)

Suszko's Thesis maintains that many-valued logics do not exist at all. In order to support it, R. Suszko offered a method for providing any structural abstract logic with a complete set of bivaluations. G. Malinowski challenged Suszko's Thesis by constructing a new class of logics (called q-logics by him) for which Suszko's method fails. He argued that the key for logical two-valuedness was the "bivalent" partition of the Lindenbaum bundle associated with all structural abstract logics, while his q-logics were generated (...) by "trivalent" matrices. This paper will show that contrary to these intuitions, logical two-valuedness has more to do with the geometrical properties of the deduction relation of a logical structure than with the algebraic properties embedded on it. (shrink)

Multialgebras have been much studied in mathematics and in computer science. In 2016 Carnielli and Coniglio introduced a class of multialgebras called swap structures, as a semantic framework for dealing with several Logics of Formal Inconsistency that cannot be semantically characterized by a single finite matrix. In particular, these LFIs are not algebraizable by the standard tools of abstract algebraic logic. In this paper, the first steps towards a theory of non-deterministic algebraization of logics by swap structures are given. Specifically, (...) a formal study of swap structures for LFIs is developed, by adapting concepts of universal algebra to multialgebras in a suitable way. A decomposition theorem similar to Birkhoff’s representation theorem is obtained for each class of swap structures. Moreover, when applied to the 3-valued algebraizable logics J3 and Ciore, their classes of algebraic models are retrieved, and the swap structures semantics become twist structures semantics. This fact, together with the existence of a functor from the category of Boolean algebras to the category of swap structures for each LFI, suggests that swap structures can be seen as non-deterministic twist structures. This opens new avenues for dealing with non-algebraizable logics by the more general methodology of multialgebraic semantics. (shrink)

We provide a model in which students must choose whether or not to cheat on a course exam. By assuming that the moral cost of acting dishonestly decreases as the number of other people who behave in the same way increases, our model explains one important channel by which unethical behavior of other individuals can influence observers’ behavior. Through the use of the Global Games approach of equilibrium selection, we build a framework that provides the micro-foundations of peer effects on (...) academic dishonesty and shows how better student technology of cheating and higher disutility of effort make the cheating equilibrium more likely to be selected. By extending the model, we find that the peer effect strength is not affected by the level of homogeneity of the cohort, but decreases in the size of the class. Our approach may be seen as an important step towards reduced-form models of peer effects on dishonest behavior. (shrink)

A ideia de uma crise do rádio consolidou-se no imaginário coletivo nas últimas décadas, a despeito de não haver ancoragem na realidade. Se muitas rádios tradicionais AM e FM saem do ar, vendidas a igrejas eletrônicas ou novos grupos empresariais, multiplica-se a oferta de conteúdos no contexto de um rádio expandido, que transborda para novas plataformas e é consumido nos mais diversos dispositivos. O rádio vai bem, obrigado, embora algumas emissoras de rádio em ondas hertzianas estejam mal das pernas, lamentando-se (...) da concorrência com serviços on-line e da erosão dos habituais índices de audiência, antes medidos em centenas de milhares de ouvintes por minuto. (shrink)

Entrevista com o professor Mauro Rêgo Sá Costa para o dossiê Rádio nas Bordas.

But never let it be doubted that depression, in its extreme form, is madness. (Styron, 1990, p. 62)There is nothing wrong with our biology or our intelligence; sometimes we are just stuck. (Cvetkov...

Despite being fairly powerful, finite non-deterministic matrices are unable to characterize some logics of formal inconsistency, such as those found between mbCcl and Cila. In order to overcome this limitation, we propose here restricted non-deterministic matrices (in short, RNmatrices), which are non-deterministic algebras together with a subset of the set of valuations. This allows us to characterize not only mbCcl and Cila (which is equivalent, up to language, to da Costa's logic C_1) but the whole hierarchy of da Costa's calculi (...) C_n. This produces a novel decision procedure for these logics. Moreover, we show that the RNmatrix semantics proposed here induces naturally a labelled tableau system for each C_n, which constitutes another decision procedure for these logics. This new semantics allows us to conceive da Costa's hierarchy of C-systems as a family of (non deterministically) (n+2)-valued logics, where n is the number of "inconsistently true" truth-values and 2 is the number of "classical" or "consistent" truth-values, for every C_n. (shrink)

El abordaje que actualmente se ha intentado revelar acerca de la psicopatología desde el modelo biomédico por disciplinas como la psicología y la psiquiatría, ha delineado formalmente dichas distinciones a la hora de indagar las conductas erráticas y manifestaciones psicoemocionales en el ser humano. La filosofía, por tanto, no ha estado exenta al replantear la manera en que el ser humano es pensado, ya sea en sus márgenes de normatividad como en la alteridad. Immanuel Kant miró -dentro de su importante (...) período filosófico- estos problemas, pero de una manera superficial en un breve ensayo titulado “Ensayo sobre las enfermedades de la cabeza” (1764) donde explora desde su visión el problema de la razón invertida. La propuesta de la presente investigación busca encontrar los alcances de esta propuesta por parte del filósofo de Koninsberg, y la relectura biologicista que plantearon autores como Konrad Lorenz y Franz Wuketits como iniciadores de la Teoría Evolucionista del Conocimiento. (shrink)

Jean Hering, miembro del Círculo fenomenológico de Gotinga, fue uno de los primeros estudiantes de Husserl en llegar a Francia y exponer la fenomenología en aquel país. Por su parte, León Chestov publicaba en Francia una de las primeras críticas a la fenomenología y denunciaba el olvido del valor de la existencia y la vida. Entre ambos autores se despliega un debate fecundo en torno a la interpretación y aplicación del método fenomenológico. El presente estudio tiene la intención de exponer (...) y detallar,por un lado, el contenido de la crítica de la fenomenología de Chestov y, por otro lado, la respuesta defensiva de Hering, las cuales dieron lugar, durante la primera mitad del siglo XX, al primer debate francés sobre la filosofía husserliana. (shrink)

This study analyzes the possible occurrence of plagiarism and self-plagiarism in a sample of articles published in the Scientific Periodicals Electronic Library, an open database that indexes business journals in Brazil. The author compared one sample obtained in 2013 and another selected from 2018. In both samples, we verified the guidelines that each of the journals provided to authors regarding plagiarism and the adoption of software to detect textual similarities. In the analysis conducted in 2013, it was found that only (...) one journal mentioned the word “plagiarism” in its policies, although the majority of the directives required guarantees that no type of violation of authors’ rights was contained in the manuscript. In the analysis conducted in 2013, it was determined that there were literal reproductions in 31 published articles, and no relevant similarities with other publications were encountered in 16 articles. In the 2018 analysis, 69 of the publications included observations and guidelines related to plagiarism and self-plagiarism. In the analysis conducted in 2018, it was found that similarities occurred in 52 articles, and no relevant evidence of plagiarism or self-plagiarism was found in 66 manuscripts. Although a reduction in the index of the occurrence of plagiarism was observed, as was an increase in the instructions on the prevention of plagiarism by authors, practices directed at guiding authors by means of directives concerning the importance of preventing plagiarism in manuscripts submitted for publication can be recommended. (shrink)

Michel Foucault is one of the most preeminent theorists of power, yet the relationship between his militant activities and his analysis of power remains unclear. The book explores this relationship to explain the development of Foucault's thinking about power. Using newly translated and unpublished materials, it examines what led Foucault to take on the question of power in the early 1970s and subsequently refine his thinking, working through different models (war and government) and modalities (sovereign, disciplinary, biopolitical, pastoral and governmental). (...) Looking at Foucault's political trajectory, from his involvement with the prisoner support movement and Solidarity to his controversial engagement with the Iranian revolution, the book shows the militant underpinning of his interest in the question of power and its various shifts and mutations. This thorough account, which includes the first translation of a report edited by Foucault on prison conditions, will provide students in contemporary political theory with a better understanding of Foucault's thinking about power and of the interplay between political activities and theoretical productions. (shrink)

The logics of formal inconsistency (LFIs, for short) are paraconsistent logics (that is, logics containing contradictory but non-trivial theories) having a consistency connective which allows to recover the ex falso quodlibet principle in a controlled way. The aim of this paper is considering a novel semantical approach to first-order LFIs based on Tarskian structures defined over swap structures, a special class of multialgebras. The proposed semantical framework generalizes previous aproaches to quantified LFIs presented in the literature. The case of QmbC, (...) the simpler quantified LFI expanding classical logic, will be analyzed in detail. An axiomatic extension of QmbC called QLFI1o is also studied, which is equivalent to the quantified version of da Costa and D'Ottaviano 3-valued logic J3. The semantical structures for this logic turn out to be Tarkian structures based on twist structures. The expansion of QmbC and QLFI1o with a standard equality predicate is also considered. (shrink)

This article aims to analyze the problem of totality in Sartre in its relation with finitude. We begin with the problem of ontological solitude by which we analyze Being as the exteriority of indifference and the event of the it-self or ontological act. Postulating this event as a process of singularization and the life of the individual, we show how the finitude affects totality as totalization and singularization. Image condensed by the singular universal, the finitude, then, is not taken as (...) an isolated totality, but is understood by its opening of the human in the singularization of a life. (shrink)

Analizamos las Misiones Pedagógicas de la Segunda República española, que llevaban cultura, ocio e información a pueblos remotos a través de libros, películas, guiñoles y músicas. Todo ello con una filosofía no dogmatizante que valorizaba la identidad local. El cine propuesto se centraba en películas mayormente mudas, reportajes, comedias y proyecciones fijas, y puede clasificarse en documentales y cine recreativo.

From the early to mid-1970s, Michel Foucault posited that power consists of a relation rather than a substance and that this relation is comprised of unequal forces engaged in a warlike struggle against each other, resulting invariably in the domination of some forces over others. This understanding of power, which he retrospectively dubbed `Nietzsche's hypothesis' and `the model of war', underpinned his well-known analyses of disciplinary power. Yet, Foucault in his Collège de France course from the academic year 1975-6, `Society (...) Must Be Defended', suddenly began to call into question this understanding and his doubts about it did not abate well into the late 1970s. In this article, we suggest that his militant politics in the early 1970s sustained his adherence to the war model and that his more cautious political attitude later in the decade underpinned his suspicions about this model. Key Words: biopolitics • Henri de Boulainvilliers • Michel Foucault • Thomas Hobbes • militancy • F. W. Nietzsche • politics • power • race • war. (shrink)

Kant, los sábados por la tarde -- ¿Andaría en algo Sócrates? -- El álef de "El Aleph" -- La angustia ya no se lleva -- El tango de la muerte -- Los ilotas y la juventud maravillosa -- Los jóvenes en Flores -- El filósofo y la princesa.

This paper inquires about a well-known article written by Hannah Arendt, named Reflections on Little Rock, published in Dissent Magazine in 1959. Its importance lies in the author’s opinion about the events that took place in Little Rock, United States, as a consequence of the underline racial issue. Therefore, the purpose of this work will be to critically examine the analysis carried out by the author, crystallized in her reflections. Observing this task, firstly, a general approach will be made to (...) the political and legal background that drives his work. Next, a schematic summary of the argumentative pillars that support the central thesis of the article will be done. Finally, based on the distinction between vita activa and vita contemplativa, we will make two critical observations on her reflections: the first, referring to the distinction between public and social spaces and, the second, to the judgment made by Arendt. (shrink)

Se indagó sobre el desarrollo de la Investigación Acción Participativa en Psicología. Se observó que en América y Europa, esta metodología se utiliza en una variedad de áreas disciplinares, principalmente en la Psicología Comunitaria. Aborda fundamentalmente problemáticas sociales, comunitarias y ps..

In 1988, J. Ivlev proposed some (non-normal) modal systems which are semantically characterized by four-valued non-deterministic matrices in the sense of A. Avron and I. Lev. Swap structures are multialgebras (a.k.a. hyperalgebras) of a special kind, which were introduced in 2016 by W. Carnielli and M. Coniglio in order to give a non-deterministic semantical account for several paraconsistent logics known as logics of formal inconsistency, which are not algebraizable by means of the standard techniques. Each swap structure induces naturally a (...) non-deterministic matrix. The aim of this paper is to obtain a swap structures semantics for some Ivlev-like modal systems proposed in 2015 by M. Coniglio, L. Fariñas del Cerro and N. Peron. Completeness results will be stated by means of the notion of Lindenbaum–Tarski swap structures, which constitute a natural generalization to multialgebras of the concept of Lindenbaum–Tarski algebras. (shrink)

In 1986, Mikenberg et al. introduced the semantic notion of quasi-truth defined by means of partial structures. In such structures, the predicates are seen as triples of pairwise disjoint sets: the set of tuples which satisfies, does not satisfy and can satisfy or not the predicate, respectively. The syntactical counterpart of the logic of partial truth is a rather complicated first-order modal logic. In the present article, the notion of predicates as triples is recursively extended, in a natural way, to (...) any complex formula of the first-order object language. From this, a new definition of quasi-truth is obtained. The proof-theoretic counterpart of the new semantics is a first-order paraconsistent logic whose propositional base is a 3-valued logic belonging to hierarchy of paraconsistent logics known as Logics of Formal Inconsistency, which was proposed by Carnielli and Marcos in 2002. (shrink)