If I were to drop an apple, then it would fall. It is not possible that it would fly upwards. It is necessary that it would fall. I think these statements are true, but at the same time I believe that it is not logically necessary that the apple would fall. I believe that there is in nature a kind of necessity weaker than logical necessity: natural necessity.

This paper presents a new modified quantum mechanics, Critical Complexity Quantum Mechanics, which includes a new account of wavefunction collapse. This modified quantum mechanics is shown to arise naturally from a fully discrete physics, where all physical quantities are discrete rather than continuous. I compare this theory with the spontaneous collapse theories of Ghirardi, Rimini, Weber and Pearle and discuss some implications of these theories and CCQM for a realist view of the quantum realm.

The central motivating idea behind the development of this work is the concept of prespace, a hypothetical structure that is postulated by some physicists to underlie the fabric of space or space-time. I consider how such a structure could relate to space and space-time, and the rest of reality as we know it, and the implications of the existence of this structure for quantum theory. Understanding how this structure could relate to space and to the rest of reality requires, I (...) believe, that we consider how space itself relates to reality, and how other so-called "spaces" used in physics relate to reality. In chapter 2, I compare space and space-time to other spaces used in physics, such as configuration space, phase space and Hilbert space. I support what is known as the "property view" of space, opposing both the traditional views of space and space-time, substantivalism and relationism. I argue that all these spaces are property spaces. After examining the relationships of these spaces to causality, I argue that configuration space has, due to its role in quantum mechanics, a special status in the microscopic world similar to the status of position space in the macroscopic world. In chapter 3, prespace itself is considered. One way of approaching this structure is through the comparison of the prespace structure with a computational system, in particular to a cellular automaton, in which space or space-time and all other physical quantities are broken down into discrete units. I suggest that one way open for a prespace metaphysics can be found if physics is made fully discrete in this way. I suggest as a heuristic principle that the physical laws of our world are such that the computational cost of implementing those laws on an arbitrary computational system is minimized, adapting a heuristic principle of this type proposed by Feynman. In chapter 4, some of the ideas of the previous chapters are applied in an examination of the physics and metaphysics of quantum theory. I first discuss the "measurement problem" of quantum mechanics: this problem and its proposed solution are the primary subjects of chapter 4. It turns out that considering how quantum theory could be made fully discrete leads naturally to a suggestion of how standard linear quantum mechanics could be modified to give rise to a solution to the measurement problem. The computational heuristic principle reinforces the same solution. I call the modified quantum mechanics Critical Complexity Quantum Mechanics (CCQM). I compare CCQM with some of the other proposed solutions to the measurement problem, in particular the spontaneous localization model of Ghirardi, Rimini and Weber. Finally, in chapters 5 and 6, I argue that the measure of complexity of quantum mechanical states I introduce in CCQM also provides a new definition of entropy for quantum mechanics, and suggests a solution to the problem of providing an objective foundation for statistical mechanics, thermodynamics, and the arrow of time. (shrink)

We maintain that there is something called natural necessity that is involved in the laws of nature -laws are concerned with what must happen, and what could not possibly happen. rather than merely what does and does not happen. Some recent believers in natural necessity, such as Dretske [1977], Tooley [1977,1987] and Armstrong [1978, 1983], have argued that this natural necessity arises from certain relations among the properties of things in our world - they argue that there are relations of (...) “neessitation” holding among universals. We endorse this theory that laws involve reiatiorts among properties of things. Howev- er, we thinlt that more needs to be said about what underlies this relation of necessitation. In this paper we assume that there exist certain complex properties, which we call states of systems, or just states, and we postulate that there are some states that are natural for our world and other states that are non-natural for our world. Given that there does exist a real distinction between natural and non-natural states for our world, there will be a definable kind of natural necessity - there will be a significant sense in which laws really do tell us what must happen and what could not possibly happen. (shrink)

The four frescoes by Raphael in the Stanza della Segnatura in the Vatican Museum visually embody close approximations of several numerical ratios that are of deep significance in the material grounding of musical harmonies in the physics of natural harmonics. Of special significance is the Pythagorean musical frequency ratio of 9:8, the whole tone interval, which in Plato's Timaeus is called the epogdoôn.

The Routledge International Handbook of Neuroaesthetics is an authoritative reference work that provides the reader with a wide-ranging introduction to this exciting new scientific discipline. The book brings together leading international academics to offer a well-balanced overview of this burgeoning field while addressing two questions central to the field; how the brain computes aesthetic appreciation for sensory objects, and how is art created and experienced.

Studie předkládá interpretaci souboru článků, které Jan Patočka uveřejnil na počátku své filosofické kariéry a v nichž programově vyložil vlastní stanovisko k problematice historického poznání a smyslu dějin. Na základě výkladu Patočkových statí studie konstatuje, že soubor ve svém celku připravuje předložení ucelené filosofické koncepce a že jeho prostřednictvím Patočka přispěl k soudobé diskusi, „sporu o smysl českých dějin“. Studie nejprve nabízí představení tohoto sporu a jeho dobového kontextu a argumentuje, že tato souvislost má podstatný význam pro porozumění Patočkovým textům. (...) Na základě toho poté studie shrnuje Patočkovu interpretaci hlavních zainteresovaných argumentačních pozic a kritiku, kterou vůči nim snáší. V následujícím kroku studie předkládá interpretaci Patočkova vlastního pojetí dějin. Na závěr představuje východisko tohoto pojetí, Patočkovu koncepci člověka. The paper proposes an interpretation of a set of articles published by Jan Patočka at the beginning of his philosophical career, in which he programmatically sets forth his point of view of the problem of historical knowledge and the meaning of history. Based on the reading of the texts the paper arrives at the conclusion that this collection as a whole anticipates a comprehensive philosophical concept and that by means of these texts Patočka contributed to the discussion of the day, “the dispute over the meaning of Czech history”. The paper begins by presenting the dispute as well as its contemporary context and argues that this link bears essential significance to the understanding of Patočka’s texts. On this basis it then summarizes Patočka’s interpretation of the different parties of the argument and the critique to which he submits them. In the next step the paper presents Patočka’s interpretation of his own conception of history. It concludes by an exposition of the basis of this conception, Patočka’s concept of man. (shrink)

Of course, although this view on meaning was the prevailing one for almost a century, many of the people who initiated the enterprise of logical semantics, including people like Frege and Wittgenstein, had an open eye for all that it did not catch. However, the logical means which Frege, Wittgenstein, Russell, and the generation that succeeded them, had at their disposal were those of classical mathematical logic and set-theory, and these indeed are not very suited for an analysis of other (...) aspects of meaning than those which the slogan covers. A real change in view then had to await the emergence of other concepts, which in due course became available mainly under the influence of developments in computer science and cognate disciplines such as artificial intelligence. And this is one of the reasons why it took almost a century before any serious and successful challenge of the view that meaning equals truthconditions from within logical semantics could emerge. (shrink)

Recent developments in Continental philosophy have included the emergence of a school of “speculative realism,” which rejects the human-centered orientation that has long dominated Continental thought. Proponents of speculative realism differ on several issues, but many agree on the need for an object-oriented ontology. Some speculative realists identify realism with materialism, while others accord equal reality to objects that are non-material, even fictional. Several thinkers retain a focus on difference, a well-established theme in Continental thought. This paper looks at speculative (...) realism from the perspective of systems theory. Many of the tenets of speculative realism have long been features of systems metaphysics and are expressed clearly in a systems framework. However, some views of some speculative realists differ substantially from systems theoretic ideas. (shrink)

Is it right to convict a person of a crime on the basis of purely statistical evidence? Many who have considered this question agree that it is not, posing a direct challenge to legal probabilism – the claim that the criminal standard of proof should be understood in terms of a high probability threshold. Some defenders of legal probabilism have, however, held their ground: Schoeman (1987) argues that there are no clear epistemic or moral problems with convictions based on purely (...) statistical evidence, and speculates that our aversion to such convictions may be nothing more than an irrational bias. More recently, Hedden and Colyvan (2019, section VI) describe our reluctance to convict on the basis of purely statistical evidence as an ‘intuition’, but suggest that there may be no ‘in principle’ problem with such convictions (see also Papineau, forthcoming, section 6). In this paper, I argue that there is, in some cases, an in principle problem with a conviction based upon statistical evidence alone – namely, it commits us to a precedent which, if consistently followed through, could lead to the deliberate conviction of an innocent person. I conclude with some reflections on the idea that the criminal justice system should strive to maximise the accuracy of its verdicts – and the related idea that we should each strive to maximise the accuracy of our beliefs. (shrink)

And, as The Promise of Salvation makes clear through abundant empirical evidence, religion will not disappear as long as these promises continue to help people ...

The phenomenon of altruism extends from the biological realm to the human sociocultural realm. This article sketches a coherent outline of multiple types of altruism of progressively increasing scope that span these two realms and are grounded in an ever-expanding sense of “self.” Discussion of this framework notes difficulties associated with altruism at different levels. It links scientific ideas about the evolution of cooperation and about hierarchical order to perennial philosophical and religious concerns. It offers a conceptual background for inquiry (...) into societal challenges that call for altruistic behavior, especially the challenge of environmental and social sustainability. (shrink)

In this paper I respond to Marcello Di Bello’s criticisms of the ‘normic account’ of the criminal standard of proof. In so doing, I further elaborate on what the normic account predicts about certain significant legal categories of evidence, including DNA and fingerprint evidence and eyewitness identifications.

In this paper I propose a new solution to the problem of change: situationalism. According to this view, parts of reality fundamentally disagree about what is the case and reality as a whole is unsettled (i.e. metaphysically indeterminate). When something changes, parts of the world irreconcilably disagree about what properties it has. From this irreconcilable disagreement, indeterminacy arises. I develop this picture using situations, which are parts of possible worlds; this gives it the name situationalism. It allows a B-theory endurance (...) view on which there is genuine incompatibility when things change. There are costs to the view, which are explored, but it is a novel approach which offers a distinct explanation of what happens when things exist through change. (shrink)

Pastor and author Martin Thielen has compiled a list of ten things people need to believe, and ten things they don't, in order to be a Christian. This lively and engaging book will be a help to seekers as well as a comfort to believers who may find themselves questioning some of the assumptions they grew up with. With an accessible, storytelling style that's grounded in solid biblical scholarship, Thielen shows how Christians don't need to believe that sinners will (...) be "left behind" to burn in hell or that it's heresy to believe in evolution. And while we must always take the Bible seriously, we don't always have to take it literally. At the same time, Christians do need to believe in Jesus--his life, his teachings, his death and resurrection, and his vision for the world. A great benefit of those beliefs is that they provide promising answers to life's most profound questions, including: Where is God? What matters most? What brings fulfillment? What about suffering? Is there hope? Thielen articulates centrist, mainline Christianity in a way that's fresh and easy to understand, and offers authentic Christian insights that speak to our deepest needs. This new edition includes a leader's guide, previously only available online, and a new introduction from the author that reflects on the book's reception. The leader's guide features unique and easily implemented aids for carrying out a seven-week, congregation-wide initiative that will help local churches reach out to their communities. More information is available at thielen.wjkbooks.com. (shrink)

The new western way of war from Vietnam in Iraq -- Theories of the new western way of war -- The global surveillance mode of warfare -- Rules of risk-transfer war -- Iraq: risk economy of a war -- A way of war in crisis.

A moral requirement R1 is said to be lexically prior to a moral requirement R2 just in case we are morally obliged to uphold R1 at the expense of R2 – no matter how many times R2 must be violated thereby. While lexical priority is a feature of many ethical theories, and arguably a part of common sense morality, attempts to model it within the framework of decision theory have led to a series of problems – a fact which is (...) sometimes spun as a ‘decision theoretic critique’ of lexical priority. In this paper, I develop an enriched decision theoretic framework that is capable of modelling lexical priority while avoiding all extant problems. This will involve introducing several new ingredients into the standard decision theoretic framework, including multidimensional utilities, de minimis risks, and the means to represent two different conceptions of risk. (shrink)

Entitlement is defined as a sort of epistemic justification that one can possess by default – a sort of epistemic justification that does not need to be earned or acquired. Epistemologists who accept the existence of entitlement generally have a certain anti-sceptical role in mind for it – entitlement is intended to help us resist what would otherwise be compelling radical sceptical arguments. But this role leaves various details unspecified and, thus, leaves scope for a number of different potential conceptions (...) of entitlement. At one extreme there are conceptions that portray entitlement as a weak, attenuated epistemic status and, at the other, we have conceptions that portray entitlement as something potent and strong. Certain intermediate conceptions are also possible. In this paper, I shall argue that the weak and intermediate conceptions of entitlement do not survive careful scrutiny, and the stronger conceptions – while they do, in a way, strain credulity – are the only conceptions that are ultimately viable. (shrink)

Die Konstitution des menschlich-personalen Geistes ist fur Augustinus und Anselm von<I> Canterbury von<I> zentraler Bedeutung. Dabei sind Einheit und Identitat des Geistes und die Erkenntnis Gottes als des immer schon gewussten absoluten Grundes untrennbar miteinander verbunden. Dies wird bei Augustinus unter anderem in der Zeituberhobenheit des Geistes und bei Anselm im ontologischen Argument deutlich. Mit Hilfe der gewonnenen Erkenntnisse konnen auch unterschiedliche Perspektiven in okumenischer Hinsicht deutlich gemacht werden, wie anhand zweier Exkurse aufgezeigt wird.".

This volume explores emotion in medieval and early modern thought, and opens a contemporary debate on the way emotions figure in our cognitive lives.

The standard of proof applied in civil trials is the preponderance of evidence, often said to be met when a proposition is shown to be more than 50% likely to be true. A number of theorists have argued that this 50%+ standard is too weak – there are circumstances in which a court should find that the defendant is not liable, even though the evidence presented makes it more than 50% likely that the plaintiff’s claim is true. In this paper, (...) I will recapitulate the familiar arguments for this thesis, before defending a more radical one: The 50%+ standard is also too strong – there are circumstances in which a court should find that a defendant is liable, even though the evidence presented makes it less than 50% likely that the plaintiff’s claim is true. I will argue that the latter thesis follows naturally from the former once we accept that the parties in a civil trial are to be treated equally. I will conclude by sketching an alternative interpretation of the civil standard of proof. (shrink)

Discussions often end before the issues that started them have been resolved. For example, in the late sixties and early seventies, a hot topic in philosophical logic was the development of an adequate semantics for the language of modal predicate logic. However, the result of this discussion was not one single system that met with general agreement, but a collection of alternative systems, each defended most ably by its proponents.

Charting new routes for film ethics, _Transformational Ethics of Film_ develops a critical account of the ethics of personal transformation at work within the ‘film as philosophy’ debate.

This work is an exceptionally rich account both of the connections and divergences between Levinas and Derrida as ethical thinkers. Against the backdrop of nineteenth and twentieth century philosophy and phenomenology, Srajek draws on Hermann Cohen's ethics of correlation so as to demonstrate how far it is possible to read Levinas and Derrida as constructing similar approaches to ethics.

What is the proper balance between legislative and judicial innovation and between formal and functional family recognition once legislatures have addressed gay men’s and lesbians’ families? In the civil-law jurisdiction of Quebec, legislative reforms allow two women to register as a child’s mothers. But judges have recognized a second mother ‘in fact’ by orders sharing custody where the parties had not used the new legislative channels. Such judicial creativity is reconcilable with the civil law and comparative scholars should flag it (...) as a valuable resource. But it risks undermining legislative choices about family recognition. Perhaps the option to give a child a second mother includes the choice for a lesbian birth mother not to do so. Once two women become thinkable as spouses and mothers, judges risk inappropriately pressing a rich range of queer kinship possibilities into standard models. (shrink)

This paper contributes to international feminist debates on shared parenting and family violence via reforms to Canada’s Divorce Act, in force since 2021. Looking backwards, it reviews parliamentary debates and early judicial discussions. The documentary review reads the reforms as an unstable compromise between calls from feminist voices and experts on family violence and from groups representing fathers. Family violence is now defined broadly and declared relevant to children’s welfare. But language in the statute may undermine its seriousness. Exposing the (...) tensions underlying these reforms is useful for Canadian participants in family justice and for scholars, practitioners, and policymakers elsewhere, exemplifying the promise and perils of reform in this area. Looking ahead, the paper offers recommendations to higher courts. Appellate judges should read rules on contact with both parents and parental cooperation in the light of the new recognition of family violence, taking the latter as an overarching objective of the statute. (shrink)

This paper contributes to feminist debates on cohabitation by studying judicial discourse after legal reform. It examines how Canadian judges speak about cohabitation and decide whether cohabitants qualify as “spouses” for the purposes of property sharing. Judges assess cohabitants against an ideal of companionate marriage with gendered and class overtones. A contrasting tendency is to disavow moral judgments by declaring openness to a diversity of relationships. It seems difficult to operationalize cohabitation as a relationship form distinct from marriage. Indeed, the (...) cases undermine assertions that reform makes married couples and cohabitants equal. Efforts to “modernize” family law appear to give new life to traditional ideals of the good marriage. (shrink)

The present article deals with issues of social recognition in the global and transnational environment. It deals with the issue of solidarity, a form of recognition that has no adequate parallel beyond nation state borders and manifests itself mainly in the transnational economy. We focus on the articulation of the extraterritorial recognition of social rights-holders at the international and transnational levels of justice. It is clear that conditions in developing countries do not allow the people there to express disapproval in (...) ways that are typical for Western societies. We stress that states should strengthen their influence in global and transnational organizations and equally that the media should improve its informative role and should provide information on what is happening in developing parts of the world. (shrink)

Sicker examines the fundamental issues of the relationship of the individual to society and state, the implications for public policy of the Judaic focus on ...

Heidegger in America explores the surprising legacy of his life and thought in the United States of America. As a critic of modern life, Heidegger often lamented the growing global influence of all things American. However, it was precisely in America where his thought inspired the work of generations of thinkers – not only philosophers but also theologians, architects, novelists, and even pundits. As a result, the reception and dissemination of Heidegger's philosophical writings transformed the intellectual and cultural history of (...) the United States at a time when American influence was itself transforming the world. A case study in the complex and sometimes contradictory process of transnational exchange, Heidegger in America recasts the scope and methods of contemporary intellectual and cultural history in the age of globalization, challenging what we think we know about Heidegger and American ideas simultaneously. (shrink)

In this paper we discuss the hypothesis that, ‘moral agency is distributed over both humans and technological artefacts’, recently proposed by Peter-Paul Verbeek. We present some arguments for thinking that Verbeek is mistaken. We argue that artefacts such as bridges, word processors, or bombs can never be (part of) moral agents. After having discussed some possible responses, as well as a moderate view proposed by Illies and Meijers, we conclude that technological artefacts are neutral tools that are at most bearers (...) of instrumental value. (shrink)

Explores film's connections to the other arts and the qualities that distinguish it from them. He explores the cinema's singular aesthetic potential and uses specific examples from a diverse range of films--from Antonioni and Hitchcock to The Searchers and The Bourne Supremacy--to demonstrate the many ways this potential can be realized.