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  1. Extensive and strategic forms: Games and models for games.Robert Stalnaker - 1999 - Research in Economics 53 (3):293 - 319.
     
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    Synchronic information, knowledge and common knowledge in extensive games.Giacomo Bonanno - 1999 - Research in Economics 53 (1):77-99.
    Restricting attention to the class of extensive games defined by von Neumann and Morgenstern with the added assumption of perfect recall, we specify the information of each player at each node of the game-tree in a way which is coherent with the original information structure of the extensive form. We show that this approach provides a framework for a formal and rigorous treatment of questions of knowledge and common knowledge at every node of the tree. We construct a particular information (...)
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