A recent legal ruling in the United States regarding ‘intelligent design’ argued that ID is not science because it invokes a supernatural agent. It therefore cannot be taught in public schools. But the important philosophical question is not whether ID invokes a supernatural agent; it is whether it meets the standards we expect of any explanation in the sciences. More generally, could any proposed theistic explanation – one that invokes the deity of classical theism – meet those standards? Could it (...) be both scientific and religious? The present paper sets out the factors to be taken into account when answering this question. (shrink)

In a recent Chapter, Alexander Pruss attempts to defend the traditional Christian doctrine of Eucharistic Transubstantiation. It is objected that his case is unconvincing, since it involves accidents and dispositions existing without subjects, and an inadequate account of the Eucharistic presence of Christ. It is argued that the doctrine can yet be maintained, along Aristotelian-Thomistic lines.

The reference to man as animal rationale has traditionally been used to highlight rationality as marking a qualitative gap between human beings and animals. This assumption has been questioned in a similar way by the approaches of Alasdair MacIntyre and John Dewey, who agree that before we can make adequate sense of man’s rationality, we have to draw attention to animality as the common trait of human and nonhuman living beings. However, while MacIntyre takes human dependence to show ‘why human (...) beings need the virtues,’ Dewey considers it as a starting point to argue for the necessity of what he calls ‘natural piety.’ In my paper I shall elaborate some implications of this difference, guided by the question whether Dewey’s answer contributes to a re-invention of religious categories into the naturalistic view on rationality and morality. (shrink)

Skeptical theists purport to undermine evidential arguments from evil by appealing to the fact that our knowledge of goods, evils, and their interconnections is significantly limited. Michael J. Almeida and Graham Oppy have recently argued that skeptical theism is unacceptable because it results in a form of moral skepticism which rejects inferences that play an important role in our ordinary moral reasoning. In this reply to Almeida and Oppy’s argument we offer some reasons for thinking that skeptical theism need not (...) lead to any such objectionable form of moral skepticism. (shrink)