The most widely endorsed philosophical and scientific theories of consciousness assume that it contributes a single functional capacity to an organism’s information processing toolkit. However, conscious processes are a heterogeneous class of psychological phenomena supported by a variety of neurobiological mechanisms. This suggests a plurality of functional contributions of consciousness (FCCs), in the sense that conscious experience facilitates different functional capacities in different psychological domains. In this paper, I first develop a general methodological framework for isolating the psychological functions that (...) are associated with conscious experience. I then use this to show that the leading accounts—Global Workspace Theories, Higher Order Thought Theory and Information Integration Theory—all fail to acknowledge this functional pluralism, which limits their applicability as theories of consciousness. (shrink)

There is ongoing philosophical debate about the kinds of properties that are represented in visual perception. Both “rich” and “thin” accounts of perceptual content are concerned with how prior assumptions about the world influence the construction of perceptual representations. However, the idea that biased assumptions resulting from oppressive social structures contribute to the contents of perception has been largely neglected historically in this debate in the philosophy of perception. I draw on neurobiological evidence of the role of the amygdala in (...) visual processing to show that the influence of biased assumptions on visual perception gives us a unique path to rich evaluative content that does not require an appeal to controversial mechanisms like top-down modulation. (shrink)

RésuméLes philosophes et les scientifiques présument en général que la conscience est caractérisée par « un point de vue à la première personne ». Selon une interprétation de cette revendication, les expériences sont définies, au moins en partie, par des représentations qui encodent un « point de vue » centré sur le sujet. Par contre, les revendications sur les caractéristiques déterminantes de la conscience doivent être attentives à la possibilité d'une dissociation : si une structure neurobiologique ou une fonction psychologique (...) n'est pas nécessaire ni suffisante pour la conscience, elle ne peut pas être un attribut distinctif dans un sens robuste. Je fais appel à la recherche sur l’émotion inconsciente, l'action guidée par la perception, la constance perceptuelle et les troubles psychiques pour soutenir que les représentations à la première personne dissocient de l'expérience consciente. (shrink)

Abstract“Autonomous Sensory Meridian Response” (ASMR) refers to a sensory‐emotional experience that was first explicitly identified and named within the past two decades in online discussion boards. Since then, there has been mounting psychological and neural evidence of a clustering of properties common to the phenomenon of ASMR, including convergence on the set of stimuli that trigger the experience, the properties of the experience itself, and its downstream effects. Moreover, psychological instruments have begun to be developed and employed in an attempt (...) to measure it. Based on this empirical work, we make the case that despite its nonscientific origins, ASMR is a good candidate for being a real kind in the cognitive sciences. The phenomenon appears to have a robust causal profile and may also have an adaptive evolutionary history. We also argue that a more thorough understanding of the distinctive type of phenomenal experience involved in an ASMR episode can shed light on the functions of consciousness, and ultimately undermine certain “cognitive” theories of consciousness. We conclude that ASMR should be the subject of more extensive scientific investigation, particularly since it may also have the potential for therapeutic applications. (shrink)