Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):253-289 (2005)
I oppose the popular view that the phenomenal character of perceptual experience consists in the subject's representing the (putative) perceived object as being so-and-so. The account of perceptual experience I favor instead is a version of the "Theory of Appearing" that takes it to be a matter of the perceived object's appearing to one as so-and-so, where this does not mean that the subject takes or believes it to be so-and-so. This plays no part in my criticisms of Representationalism. I mention it only to be up front as to where I stand. My criticism of the Representationalist position is in sections. (1) There is no sufficient reason for positing a representative function for perceptual experience. It doesn't seem on the face of it to be that, and nothing serves in place of such seeming. (2) Even if it did have such a function, it doesn't have the conceptual resources to represent a state of affairs. (3) Even if it did, it is not suited to represent, e.g., a physical property of color. (4) Finally, even if I am wrong about the first three points, it is still impossible for the phenomenal character of the perceptual experience to consist in it's representing what it does. My central argument for this central claim of the paper is that it is metaphysically, de re possible that one have a certain perceptual experience without it's presenting any state of affairs. And since all identities hold necessarily, this identity claim fails
|Keywords||Epistemology Experience Perception Representation Representationalism|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
Citations of this work BETA
Heirs of Nothing: The Implications of Transparency.Matthew Kennedy - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):574-604.
Transparency, Intentionalism, and the Nature of Perceptual Content.Jeff Speaks - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):539-573.
Externalist Justification and the Role of Seemings.Michael Bergmann - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (1):163-184.
Experiences as Complex Events.Michael Jacovides - 2010 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 48 (2):141-159.
Non-Transitive Looks & Fallibilism.Philippe Chuard - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 149 (2):161 - 200.
Similar books and articles
Seeing It All Clearly: The Real Story on Blurry Vision.Robert Schroer - 2002 - American Philosophical Quarterly 39 (3):297-301.
Perception and the Reach of Phenomenal Content.Tim Bayne - 2009 - Philosophical Quarterly 59 (236):385-404.
The Spatial Content of Experience.Brad J. Thompson - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):146-184.
A Limited Defense of Moral Perception.Justin P. McBrayer - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 149 (3):305–320.
Perceptual Experience, Conscious Content, and Nonconceptual Content.Uriah Kriegel - 2004 - Essays in Philosophy 5 (1):1-14.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads327 ( #8,961 of 2,171,848 )
Recent downloads (6 months)6 ( #46,603 of 2,171,848 )
How can I increase my downloads?