Acta Analytica 25 (2):215-241 (2010)

Anne Baril
Washington University in St. Louis
Some beliefs seem more significant than others. This paper suggests an approach to explaining this apparent fact. As there are multiple senses in which one belief may be more significant than another, multiple possible sources of such significance, and, moreover, no prima facie reason to expect a single, unified account under which all these senses and sources can be subsumed, I propose the modest approach of articulating just one feature in virtue of which a belief may fairly be called significant: that of bearing a certain relation to human flourishing, a relation that more trivial truths do not bear. From such modest projects can a complete solution to the problem (or, more accurately, problems) of significance emerge.
Keywords Significance  Important beliefs  Trivial truths  Phonebook truths  Eudaimonia
Categories No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s12136-010-0093-x
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 59,827
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Knowledge in a Social World.Alvin I. Goldman - 1999 - Oxford University Press.
Science, Truth, and Democracy.Philip Kitcher - 2001 - Oxford University Press.
Two Distinctions in Goodness.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1983 - Philosophical Review 92 (2):169-195.

View all 21 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Expressivism and Convention-Relativism About Epistemic Discourse.Allan Hazlett - forthcoming - In A. Fairweather & O. Flanagan (eds.), Naturalizing Epistemic Virtue. Cambridge University Press.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

The Quantitative Problem of Old Evidence.E. C. Barnes - 1999 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 50 (2):249-264.
Ineffability, Signification and the Meaning of Life.Roy W. Perrett - 2010 - Philosophical Papers 39 (2):239-255.
Design Research Programs.Maarten Franssen - 2005 - Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 84 (1):139-153.
A Modest Proposal for Interpreting Structural Explanations.Mariam Thalos - 1998 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49 (2):279-295.


Added to PP index

Total views
121 ( #84,614 of 2,432,722 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
3 ( #213,901 of 2,432,722 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes