Epistemic Contrastivism

Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2017)
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Abstract

Contrastivism about knowledge is the view that one does not just know some proposition. It is more adequate to say that one knows something rather than something else: I know that I am looking at a tree rather than a bush but I do not know that I am looking at a tree rather than a cleverly done tree imitation. Knowledge is a three-place relation between a subject, a proposition and a contrast set of propositions. There are several advantages of a contrastivist view but also certain problems with it.

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Author's Profile

Peter Baumann
Swarthmore College

References found in this work

Solving the skeptical problem.Keith DeRose - 1995 - Philosophical Review 104 (1):1-52.
Epistemic operators.Fred I. Dretske - 1970 - Journal of Philosophy 67 (24):1007-1023.
Solving the Skeptical Problem.Keith DeRose - 1999 - In Keith DeRose & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Skepticism: a contemporary reader. New York: Oxford University Press.
Knowing the Answer.Jonathan Schaffer - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (2):383-403.

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