ProtoSociology:206-220 (2013)

Authors
Miren Boehm
University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee
Abstract
Hume’s views concerning the existence of body or external objects are notoriously difficult and intractable. The paper sheds light on the concept of body in Hume’s Treatise by defending three theses. First, that Hume’s fundamental tenet that the only objects that are present to the mind are perceptions must be understood as methodological, rather than metaphysical or epistemological. Second, that Hume considers legitimate the fundamental assumption of natural philosophy that through experience and observation we know body. Third, that many of the contradictions and difficulties that interpreters attribute to Hume’s concept of body should be attributed instead, as Hume does, to every system of philosophy.
Keywords external objects  theory of perceptions  mind  natural philosophy  moral philosophy  foundation of science  internal method
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Reprint years 2013
ISBN(s) 1434-4319
DOI 10.5840/protosociology20133011
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References found in this work BETA

An Inquiry Into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense.Thomas Reid - 1997 - In Elizabeth Schmidt Radcliffe, Richard McCarty, Fritz Allhoff & Anand Vaidya (eds.), Late Modern Philosophy: Essential Readings with Commentary. Blackwell.
Hume's Foundational Project in the Treatise.Miren Boehm - 2016 - European Journal of Philosophy 24 (1):55-77.

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