Two Ways to Kill a Patient

Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 43 (1):44-63 (2018)
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Abstract

According to the Standard View, a doctor who withdraws life-sustaining treatment does not kill the patient but rather allows the patient to die—an important distinction, according to some. I argue that killing can be understood in either of two ways, and given the relevant understanding, the Standard View is insulated from typical criticisms. I conclude by noting several problems for the Standard View that remain to be fully addressed.

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Ben Bronner
George Washington University

Citations of this work

Ontological Classifications and Human Rationality in Bioethics.Alexandra T. Romanyshyn - 2019 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 44 (4):391-402.
Getting Real About Killing and Allowing to Die: A Critical Discussion of the Literature.Andrew Stumpf & Dominic Rogalski - 2021 - Canadian Journal of Bioethics / Revue canadienne de bioéthique 4 (2).

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References found in this work

A defense of abortion.Judith Jarvis Thomson - 1971 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 1 (1):47-66.
The limits of morality.Shelly Kagan - 1989 - New York: Oxford University Press.
The sanctity-of-life doctrine in medicine: a critique.Helga Kuhse - 1987 - New York: Oxford University Press.

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