What is a brain state?

Philosophical Psychology 19 (6):729-742 (2006)
Abstract
Philosophers have been talking about brain states for almost 50 years and as of yet no one has articulated a theoretical account of what one is. In fact this issue has received almost no attention and cognitive scientists still use meaningless phrases like 'C-fiber firing' and 'neuronal activity' when theorizing about the relation of the mind to the brain. To date when theorists do discuss brain states they usually do so in the context of making some other argument with the result being that any discussion of what brain states are has a distinct en passant flavor. In light of this it is a goal of mine to make brain states the center of attention by providing some general discussion of them. I briefly look at the argument of Bechtel and Mundale, as I think that they expose a common misconception philosophers had about brain states early on. I then turn to briefly examining Polger's argument, as I think he offers an intuitive account of what we expect brain states to be as well as a convincing argument against a common candidate for knowledge about brain states that is currently "on the scene." I then introduce a distinction between brain states and states of the brain: Particular brain states occur against background states of the brain. I argue that brain states are patterns of synchronous neural firing, which reflects the electrical face of the brain; states of the brain are the gating and modulating of neural activity and reflect the chemical face of the brain
Keywords neural synchrony  identity theory
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1080/09515080600923271
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Naming and Necessity.Saul A. Kripke - 1980 - Harvard University Press.
Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 2010 - In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Philosophy. Routledge. pp. 431-433.
Sensations and Brain Processes.Jjc Smart - 1959 - Philosophical Review 68 (April):141-56.
An Argument for the Identity Theory.David Lewis - 1970 - Journal of Philosophy 63 (2):17-25.

View all 13 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
The Myth of Phenomenological Overflow.Richard Brown - 2012 - Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):599-604.
Towards a Computational Theory of Experience.Tomer Fekete & Shimon Edelman - 2011 - Consciousness and Cognition 20 (3):807-827.
Fundamentals of Whole Brain Emulation: State, Transition and Update Representations.Randal A. Koene - 2012 - International Journal of Machine Consciousness 4 (01):5-21.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Polger on the Illusion of Contingent Identity.Don Merrell - 2011 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 19 (4):593 - 602.
Attitudes as Nonentities.Lynne Rudder Baker - 1994 - Philosophical Studies 76 (2-3):175-203.
The Mind/Brain Identity Theory.Jjc Smart - 2007 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Could Mental States Be Brain Processes?Jerome A. Shaffer - 1961 - Journal of Philosophy 58 (December):813-22.
The Brain and its States.Richard Brown - 2012 - In Shimon Edelman, Tomer Fekete & Neta Zach (eds.), Being in Time: Dynamical Models of Phenomenal Experience. John Benjamins. pp. 211-238.
Of Minds and Molecules.Francis V. Raab - 1965 - Philosophy of Science 32 (January):57-72.
Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total downloads
508 ( #4,687 of 2,235,779 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
61 ( #5,692 of 2,235,779 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature