Why paraconsistent logic can only tell half the truth

Mind 111 (444):741-749 (2002)
Abstract
The aim of this paper is to show that Graham Priest's dialetheic account of semantic paradoxes and the paraconsistent logics employed cannot achieve semantic universality. Dialetheism therefore fails as a solution to semantic paradoxes for the same reason that consistent approaches did. It will be demonstrated that if dialetheism can express its own semantic principles, a strengthened liar paradox will result, which renders dialetheism trivial. In particular, the argument is not invalidated by relational valuations, which were brought into paraconsistent logic in order to avoid strengthened liar paradoxes.
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DOI 10.1093/mind/111.444.741
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Citations of this work BETA
Too Good to Be “Just True”.Marcus Rossberg - 2013 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):1-8.
Necessary Truths Are Just True: A Reply to Rossberg.Michael Hughes - 2014 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 3 (4):321-331.
Dialetheism and the Graphic Liar.Greg Littmann - 2012 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 42 (1):15-27.

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