Persons and Substances

Philosophical Studies 104 (3):253-267 (2001)
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Abstract

I have argued elsewhere that the psychological criterion of personalidentity entails that a person is not an object, but a series ofpsychological events. As this is somewhat counter-intuitive,I consider whether the psychological theorist can argue that a person, while not a substance, exists in a way that is akin to theway that substances exist. I develop ten criteria that such a`quasi-substance' should meet, and I argue that a reasonablecase can be made to show that the psychological theorist's conception of a person meets these criteria.

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Citations of this work

The Conception of a Person as a Series of Mental Events.Scott Campbell - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (2):339-358.
Is causation necessary for what matters in survival?Scott Campbell - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 126 (3):375-396.
The conception of a person as a series of mental events.Scott Campbell - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (2):339–358.
Rapid psychological change.S. Campbell - 2004 - Analysis 64 (3):256-264.
Delayed Fission and the Standard Psychological View of Personal Identity.Huiyuhl Yi - 2013 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 20 (2):173-191.

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References found in this work

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Counterparts of persons and their bodies.David Lewis - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (7):203-211.
Personal Identity.Sydney Shoemaker & Richard Swinburne - 1984 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 18 (3):184-185.
Persons, Animals, and Ourselves.P. F. Snowdon - 2004 - In Tim Crane & Katalin Farkas (eds.), Metaphysics: A Guide and Anthology. Oxford University Press UK.
The importance of being identical.John Perry - 1976 - In Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (ed.), The Identities of Persons. University of California Press. pp. 67-90.

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