Philosophical Studies 104 (3):253-267 (2001)
| Abstract |
I have argued elsewhere that the psychological criterion of personal identity entails that a person is not an object, but a series of psychological events. As this is somewhat counter-intuitive, I consider whether the psychological theorist can argue that a person, while not a substance, exists in a way that is akin to the way that substances exist. I develop ten criteria that such a 'quasi-substance' should meet, and I argue that a reasonable case can be made to show that the psychological theorist's conception of a person meets these criteria.
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| Keywords | Philosophy Philosophy Epistemology Logic Philosophy of Mind Philosophy of Religion |
| Categories | (categorize this paper) |
| Reprint years | 2004 |
| DOI | 10.1023/A:1010316330974 |
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Delayed Fission and the Standard Psychological View of Personal Identity.Huiyuhl Yi - 2013 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 20 (2):173-191.
Animals, Babies, and Subjects.Scott Campbell - 2001 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 39 (2):157-167.
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