Economics and Philosophy 30 (1):75-98 (2014)

Abstract
Capability theorists have suggested different, sometimes incompatible, ways in which their approach takes account of the value of freedom, each of which implies a different kind of normative relation between functionings and capabilities. This paper examines three possible accounts of the normative relation between functionings and capabilities, and the implications of each of these accounts in terms of degrees of paternalism. The way in which capability theorists apparently oscillate between these different accounts is shown to rest on an apparent tension between anti-paternalism and anti-fetishism. The paper then advances a fourth account, which incorporates a concern with the content-independent or ‘non-specific’ value of freedom. Only the fourth account would remove all traces of paternalism from the capability approach. Whatever reasons advocates of the capability approach might have had for rejecting this fourth account, those reasons are not internal to the capability approach itself.
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DOI 10.1017/s0266267114000054
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References found in this work BETA

What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources.Ronald Dworkin - 1981 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 10 (4):283 - 345.
The Concept of Law.Stuart M. Brown - 1963 - Philosophical Review 72 (2):250.
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Inequality Reexamined.John Roemer & Amartya Sen - 1994 - Philosophical Review 103 (3):554.

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Citations of this work BETA

Capabilitarianism.Ingrid Robeyns - forthcoming - Journal of Human Development and Capabilities.
An Agency‐Based Capability Theory of Justice.Rutger Claassen - 2017 - European Journal of Philosophy 25 (4):1279-1304.
Capability Paternalism.Rutger Claassen - 2014 - Economics and Philosophy 30 (1):57-73.
Disability: a justice-based account.Jessica Begon - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (3):935-962.
Sen is Not a Capability Theorist.Antoinette Baujard & Muriel Gilardone - 2017 - Journal of Economic Methodology 24 (1):1-19.

View all 10 citations / Add more citations

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