Philosophical Studies 127 (2):167-193 (2006)

Abstract
We assemble here in this time and place to discuss the thesis that conscious attention can provide knowledge of reference of perceptual demonstratives. I shall focus my commentary on what this claim means, and on the main argument for it found in the first five chapters of "Reference and Consciousness". The middle term of that argument is an account of what attention does: what its job or function is. There is much that is admirable in this account, and I am confident that it will be the foundation, the launching-pad, for much future work on the subject. But in the end I will argue that Campbell's picture makes the mechanisms of attention too smart: smarter than they are, smarter than they could be. If we come to a more realistic appraisal of the skills and capacities of our sub-personal minions, the "knowledge of reference" which they yield will have to be taken down a notch or two
Keywords attention   reference   sortals   inscrutability
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-005-4940-3
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References found in this work BETA

Reference and Consciousness.J. Campbell - 2002 - Oxford University Press.
Scientific Thought.C. D. Broad - 1923 - Routledge and Kegan Paul.
The Concept of Identity.Eli Hirsch - 1982 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Philosophical Significance of Attention.Sebastian Watzl - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (10):722-733.
The Role of Experience in Demonstrative Thought.Michael Barkasi - 2019 - Mind and Language 34 (5):648-666.
Reference, Perception, and Attention.Athanasios Raftopoulos - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 144 (3):339 - 360.

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

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Reference and Consciousness.J. Campbell - 2002 - Oxford University Press.
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The Philosophical Significance of Attention.Sebastian Watzl - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (10):722-733.
Reference as Attention.John Campbell - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 120 (1-3):265-76.
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The Ontological Significance of Inscrutability.Matti Eklund - 2007 - Philosophical Topics 35 (1-2):115-134.
Quine'S Inscrutability Of Reference.Joseph Grunfeld - 1981 - Logique Et Analyse 24 (September-December):441-449.

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