Related categories

203 found
Order:
1 — 50 / 203
  1. Experimental Research Upon the Phenomena of Attention.J. R. Angell - 1892 - Philosophical Review 1:688.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  2. Interest and Attention.Felix Arnold - 1906 - Philosophical Review 15:457.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  3. Restructuring Attentionality and Intentionality.P. Sven Arvidson - 2013 - Human Studies 36 (2):199-216.
    Phenomenology and experimental psychology have been largely interested in the same thing when it comes to attention. By building on the work of Aron Gurwitsch, especially his ideas of attention and restructuration, this paper attempts to articulate common ground in psychology and phenomenology of attention through discussion of a new way to think about multistability in some phenomena. What psychology views as an attentionality-intentionality phenomenon, phenomenology views as an intentionality-attentionality phenomenon. The proposal is that an awareness of this restructuring of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  4. Attentional Capture and Attentional Character.P. Sven Arvidson - 2008 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (4):539-562.
    Attentional character is a way of thinking about what is relevant in a human life, what is meaningful and how it becomes so. This paper introduces the concept of attentional character through a redefinition of attentional capture as achievement. It looks freshly at the attentional capture debate in the current cognitive sciences literature through the lens of Aron Gurwitsch’s gestalt-phenomenology. Attentional character is defined as an initially limited capacity for attending in a given environment and is located within the sphere (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  5. The Sphere of Attention: Context and Margin.P. Sven Arvidson - 2006 - Springer.
    For the first time, this book classifies how attention shifts, and argues that self-awareness, reflection, and even morality, are best thought of as dynamic...
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  6. Experimental Evidence for Three Dimensions of Attention.P. Sven Arvidson - 2004 - In Lester Embree (ed.), GurwitschS Relevancy for Cognitive Science. Springer. pp. 151--168.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  7. A Lexicon of Attention: From Cognitive Science to Phenomenology. [REVIEW]P. Sven Arvidson - 2003 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2 (2):99-132.
    This article tries to create a bridge of understanding between cognitive scientists and phenomenologists who work on attention. In light of a phenomenology of attention and current psychological and neuropsychological literature on attention, I translate and interpret into phenomenological terms 20 key cognitive science concepts as examined in the laboratory and used in leading journals. As a preface to the lexicon, I outline a phenomenology of attention, especially as a dynamic three-part structure, which I have freely amended from the work (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  8. Looking Intuit: A Phenomenological Analysis of Intuition and Attention.P. Sven Arvidson - 1997 - In R. Davis-Floyd & P. Sven Arvidson (eds.), Intuition: The Inside Story. Routledge.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  9. Toward a Phenomenology of Attention.P. Sven Arvidson - 1996 - Human Studies 19 (1):71-84.
    There is a considerable amount of research being done on attention by cognitive psychologists. I claim that in the process of measuring and mapping consciousness, these researchers have missed important phenomenological findings. After a synopsis and illustration of the nature of attention as described by Aron Gurwitsch, I critique the assumptions of current psychological research on this topic. Included is discussion of the metaphor of attention as a beam or spotlight, the concept of selective attention as the standard accomplishment, and (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  10. The Field of Consciousness: James and Gurwitsch.P. Sven Arvidson - 1992 - Transactions of the C. S. Peirce Society 28 (4):833-856.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  11. Comments on Ned Block's Target Article “Consciousness, Accessibility, and the Mesh Between Psychology and Neuroscience”.Katalin Balog - 2007 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (4):499-500.
    Block argues that relevant data in psychology and neuroscience shows that access consciousness is not constitutively necessary for phenomenality. However, a phenomenal state can be access conscious in two radically different ways. Its content can be access conscious, or its phenomenality can be access conscious. I’ll argue that while Block’s thesis is right when it is formulated in terms of the first notion of access consciousness, there is an alternative hypothesis about the relationship between phenomenality and access in terms of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  12. Varieties of Attention and of Consciousness: Evidence From Neuropsychology.Paolo Bartolomeo - 2008 - Psyche 14 (1).
    Do we need to attend to an object in order to be conscious of it, and are the objects of our attention necessarily part of our conscious experience? A tight link between attention and consciousness has often been assumed, but it has recently been questioned, on the basis of psychophysical evidence suggesting a double dissociation between top-down attention and consciousness. The present review proposes to consider these issues in the light of time-honored distinctions between exogenous and endogenous forms of attention (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  13. Attention and Mental Primer.Jacob Beck & Keith Schneider - forthcoming - Mind and Language.
    Drawing on the empirical premise that attention makes objects look more intense (bigger, faster, higher in contrast), Ned Block has argued for mental paint, a phenomenal residue that cannot be reduced to what is perceived or represented. If sound, Block’s argument would undermine direct realism and representationism, two widely held views about the nature of conscious perception. We argue that Block’s argument fails because the empirical premise it is based upon is false. Attending to an object alters its salience, but (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  14. The Psychological Meaning of Clearness.I. M. Bentley - 1904 - Mind 13 (50):242-253.
  15. Attention in Perception.Alfred Binet - 1886 - Mind 11 (44):599-600.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  16. Attention and Mental Paint1.Ned Block - 2010 - Philosophical Issues 20 (1):23-63.
    Much of recent philosophy of perception is oriented towards accounting for the phenomenal character of perception—what it is like to perceive—in a non-mentalistic way—that is, without appealing to mental objects or mental qualities. In opposition to such views, I claim that the phenomenal character of perception of a red round object cannot be explained by or reduced to direct awareness of the object, its redness and roundness—or representation of such objects and qualities. Qualities of perception that are not captured by (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   30 citations  
  17. Attention and Perceptual Adaptation.Ned Block & Susanna Siegel - 2013 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36 (4):205-206.
  18. Retrospective and Prospective Timing: Memory, Attention and Consciousness.Richard A. Block & Dan Zakay - 2001 - In Christoph Hoerl & Teresa McCormark (eds.), Time and Memory. Oxford University Press. pp. 59--76.
  19. Über das Unbemerkbare in der Wahrnehmung. Eine phänomenologische Auseinandersetzung mit dem Standpunkt der analytischen Philosophie zum Thema ,Aufmerksamkeit'.Andrea Borsato - 2013 - Husserl Studies 29 (2):113-141.
    Was wir nicht bemerken können, das können wir auch nicht wahrnehmen: Diese im Rahmen der gegenwärtigen analytischen Philosophie des Geistes weitverbreitete Ansicht wurde neulich von M. Tye und A. Noë verteidigt. Wir werden uns hier mit einigen empirischen Beispielen auseinandersetzen, die u.E. mit dieser Idee kaum in Einklang zu bringen sind und stattdessen den Gedanken nahelegen, dass die Grenzen des Wahrnehmbaren über die Grenzen sowohl des primär Bemerkbaren als auch des sekundär Bemerkbaren hinausgehen. Auf diesem Weg gelangen wir dann zur (...)
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  20. Is There Any Special Activity of Attention?Francis H. Bradley - 1886 - Mind 11 (43):305-323.
  21. What Is Self-Consciousness?Bruya Brian - 2012 - In Labirinti della mente: Visioni del mondo. Siena, Italy: Società bibliografica toscana. pp. 223-233.
    In this article, I delineate seven aspects of the process of self-consciousness in order to demonstrate that when any of the aspects is compromised, self-consciousness goes away while consciousness persists. I then suggest that the psychological phenomenon of flow is characterized by a loss of self-consciousness. The seven aspects are: 1) implicit awareness that the person and the self are identical; 2) awareness of an event or circumstance in the world internal or external to the person; 3) awareness that this (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  22. Critical Review of John Campbell: Reference and Consciousness. [REVIEW]Ingar Brinck - 2005 - Theoria 3:266-276.
  23. Multisensory Processing and Perceptual Consciousness: Part I.Robert Eamon Briscoe - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (2):121-133.
    Multisensory processing encompasses all of the various ways in which the presence of information in one sensory modality can adaptively influence the processing of information in a different modality. In Part I of this survey article, I begin by presenting a cartography of some of the more extensively investigated forms of multisensory processing, with a special focus on two distinct types of multisensory integration. I briefly discuss the conditions under which these different forms of multisensory processing occur as well as (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  24. Representationalism and the Determinacy of Visual Content.Ben Bronner - 2015 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (2):227-239.
    DETERMINACY is the claim that covert shifts in visual attention sometimes affect the determinacy of visual content (capital letters will distinguish the claim from the familiar word, 'determinacy'). Representationalism is the claim that visual phenomenology supervenes on visual representational content. Both claims are popular among contemporary philosophers of mind, and DETERMINACY has been employed in defense of representationalism. I claim that existing arguments in favor of DETERMINACY are inconclusive. As a result, DETERMINACY-based arguments in support of representationalism are not strong (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  25. Augustine and Descartes on the Function of Attention in Perceptual Awareness.Deborah Brown - 2007 - Studies in the History of Philosophy of Mind 4:153-175.
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  26. Attention and Interest.W. H. Burnham - 1909 - Philosophical Review 18:104.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  27. Reference as Attention.J. Campbell - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 120 (1-3):265-76.
  28. Reference and Consciousness.J. Campbell - 2002 - Oxford University Press.
    John Campbell investigates how consciousness of the world explains our ability to think about the world; how our ability to think about objects we can see depends on our capacity for conscious visual attention to those things. He illuminates classical problems about thought, reference, and experience by looking at the underlying psychological mechanisms on which conscious attention depends.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   164 citations  
  29. An Object-Dependent Perspective on Joint Attention.John Campbell - forthcoming - In Axel Seemann (ed.), Joint Attention: New Developments in Philosophy, Psychology and Neuroscience. The MIT Press.
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  30. Wittgenstein on Attention.John Campbell - 2000 - Philosophical Topics 28 (2):35-47.
  31. Joint Attention and the First Person.John Campbell - 1998 - In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. Cambridge University Press. pp. 123-136..
    It is sometimes said that ordinary linguistic exchange, in ordinary conversation, is a matter of securing and sustaining joint attention. The minimal condition for the success of the conversation is that the participants should be attending to the same things. So the psychologist Michael Tomasello writes, ‘I take it as axiomatic that when humans use language to communicate referentially they are attempting to manipulate the attention of another person or persons.’ I think that this is an extremely fertile approach to (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  32. Sense, Reference and Selective Attention.John Campbell - 1997 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 71 (71):55-98.
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 71 (1997), 55-74, with a reply by Michael Martin.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   9 citations  
  33. Should Damage to the Machinery for Social Perception Damage Perception.Peter Carruthers & Vincent Picciuto - 2011 - Cognitive Neuroscience 2 (2):116-17.
    We argue that Graziano and Kastner are mistaken to claim that neglect favors their self-directed social perception account of consciousness. For the latter should not predict that neglect would result from damage to mechanisms of social perception. Neglect is better explained in terms of damage to attentional mechanisms.
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  34. Attention, Fixation, and Change Blindness.Tony Cheng - 2017 - Philosophical Inquiries 5 (1):19-26.
    The topic of this paper is the complex interaction between attention, fixation, and one species of change blindness. The two main interpretations of the target phenomenon are the ‘blindness’ interpretation and the ‘inaccessibility’ interpretation. These correspond to the sparse view (Dennett 1991; Tye, 2007) and the rich view (Dretske 2007; Block, 2007a, 2007b) of visual consciousness respectively. Here I focus on the debate between Fred Dretske and Michael Tye. Section 1 describes the target phenomenon and the dialectics it entails. Section (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  35. Synthetic Phenomenology:Exploiting Embodiment to Specify the Non-Conceptual Content of Visual Experience.Ron Chrisley & J. Parthemore - 2007 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (7):44-58.
    Not all research in machine consciousness aims to instantiate phenomenal states in artefacts. For example, one can use artefacts that do not themselves have phenomenal states, merely to simulate or model organisms that do. Nevertheless, one might refer to all of these pursuits -- instantiating, simulating or modelling phenomenal states in an artefact -- as 'synthetic phenomenality'. But there is another way in which artificial agents (be they simulated or real) may play a crucial role in understanding or creating consciousness: (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  36. Gurwitsch's Phenomenal Holism.Elijah Chudnoff - 2013 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (3):559-578.
    Aron Gurwitsch made two main contributions to phenomenology. He showed how to import Gestalt theoretical ideas into Husserl’s framework of constitutive phenomenology. And he explored the light this move sheds on both the overall structure of experience and on particular kinds of experience, especially perceptual experiences and conscious shifts in attention. The primary focus of this paper is the overall structure of experience. I show how Gurwitsch’s Gestalt theoretically informed phenomenological investigations provide a basis for defending what I will call (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  37. Preattentive Precursors to Phenomenal Properties.Austen Clark - manuscript
    What are the relations between preattentive feature-placing and states of perceptual awareness? For the purposes of this paper, states of "perceptual awareness" are confined to the simplest possible exemplars: states in which one is aware of some aspect of the appearance of something one perceives. Subjective contours are used as an example. Early visual processing seems to employ independent, high-bandwidth, preattentive feature "channels", followed by a selective process that directs selective attention. The mechanisms that yield subjective contours are found very (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  38. Cross-Modal Cuing and Selective Attention.Austen Clark - 2011 - In Fiona Macpherson (ed.), The Senses: Classic and Contemporary Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press, Usa. pp. 375.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  39. Attention and Inscrutability: A Commentary on John Campbell, Reference and Consciousness.Austen Clark - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 127 (2):167-193.
    We assemble here in this time and place to discuss the thesis that conscious attention can provide knowledge of reference of perceptual demonstratives. I shall focus my commentary on what this claim means, and on the main argument for it found in the first five chapters of "Reference and Consciousness". The middle term of that argument is an account of what attention does: what its job or function is. There is much that is admirable in this account, and I am (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  40. Attention & Inscrutability.Austen Clark & Manchester Hall - unknown
    We assemble here in this time and place to discuss the thesis that conscious attention can provide knowledge of reference of perceptual demonstratives. I shall focus my commentary on what this claim means, and on the main argument for it found in the first five chapters of Reference and Consciousness. The middle term of that argument is an account of what attention does: what its job or function is. There is much that is admirable in this account, and I am (...)
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  41. Wilfrid Sellars, Perceptual Consciousness, and Theory of Attention.Paul Coates - 2004 - Essays in Philosophy 5 (1):1-25.
    The problem of the richness of visual experience is that of finding principled grounds for claims about how much of the world a person actually sees at any given moment. It is argued that there are suggestive parallels between the two-component analysis of experience defended by Wilfrid Sellars, and certain recently advanced information processing accounts of visual perception. Sellars' later account of experience is examined in detail, and it is argued that there are good reasons in support of the claim (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  42. Reply to John Campbell.Annalisa Coliva - 2002 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 9 (1):41-46.
  43. Trains, Planes, and Brains: Attention and Consciousness.Max Coltheart - 1999 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):152-153.
    O'Brien & Opie believe that some mental representations are evoked by stimuli to which a person is attending, and other mental representations are evoked by stimuli to which attention was not paid. I argue that this is the classical view of consciousness; yet this is the view which they wish to challenge.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  44. Perceptual Learning and the Contents of Perception.Kevin Connolly - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (6):1407-1418.
    Suppose you have recently gained a disposition for recognizing a high-level kind property, like the property of being a wren. Wrens might look different to you now. According to the Phenomenal Contrast Argument, such cases of perceptual learning show that the contents of perception can include high-level kind properties such as the property of being a wren. I detail an alternative explanation for the different look of the wren: a shift in one’s attentional pattern onto other low-level properties. Philosophers have (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  45. Consciousness and Attention.H. B. Coslett - 1997 - Seminars in Neurology 17:137-44.
  46. The Agential Profile of Perceptual Experience.Thomas Crowther - 2010 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 110 (2pt2):219-242.
    Reflection on cases involving the occurrence of various types of perceptual activity suggests that the phenomenal character of perceptual experience can be partly determined by agential factors. I discuss the significance of these kinds of case for the dispute about phenomenal character that is at the core of recent philosophy of perception. I then go on to sketch an account of how active and passive elements of phenomenal character are related to one another in activities like watching and looking at (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  47. Watching, Sight, and the Temporal Shape of Perceptual Activity.Thomas Crowther - 2009 - Philosophical Review 118 (1):1-27.
    There has been relatively little discussion, in contemporary philosophy of mind, of the active aspects of perceptual processes. This essay presents and offers some preliminary development of a view about what it is for an agent to watch a particular material object throughout a period of time. On this view, watching is a kind of perceptual activity distinguished by a distinctive epistemic role. The essay presents a puzzle about watching an object that arises through elementary reflection on the consequences of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  48. Intuition: The Inside Story.R. Davis-Floyd & P. Sven Arvidson (eds.) - 1997 - Routledge.
    NATURALLY. DEVELOPED. THOUGHT. Figure i these two construcrs to define a sprctrum of modes of thought, ranging ftom analytical (inrensive checking and nattow focus) to intuitive (minimal checking and btoad focus). He develops the ...
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  49. Consciousness, Attention and Commonsense.F. de Brigard - 2010 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 17 (9-10):189-201.
    In a recent paper, Christopher Mole (2008) argued in favour of the view that, according to our commonsense psychology, while consciousness is necessary for attention, attention isn’t necessary for consciousness. In this paper I offer an argument against this view. More precisely, I offer an argument against the claim that, according to our commonsense psychology, consciousness is necessary for attention. However, I don’t claim it follows from this argument that commonsense has it the other way around, viz. that consciousness isn’t (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  50. Attention and Consciousness.Felipe de Brigard & J. Prinz - 2010 - Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews 1 (1):51-59.
    For the past three decades there has been a substantial amount of scientific evidence supporting the view that attention is necessary and sufficient for perceptual representations to become conscious (i.e., for there to be something that it is like to experience a representational perceptual state). This view, however, has been recently questioned on the basis of some alleged counterevidence. In this paper we survey some of the most important recent findings. In doing so, we have two primary goals. The first (...)
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   7 citations  
1 — 50 / 203