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  1. Perceiving Properties Versus Perceiving Objects.Boyd Millar - forthcoming - Analytic Philosophy.
    The fact that you see some particular object seems to be due to the causal relation between your visual experience and that object, rather than to your experiences’ phenomenal character. On the one hand, whenever some phenomenal element of your experience stands in the right sort of causal relation to some object, your experience presents that object (your experience’s phenomenology doesn’t need to match that object). On the other hand, you can’t have a perceptual experience that presents some object unless (...)
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  2. Perceptual Capacitism: An Argument for Disjunctive Disunity.James Openshaw & Assaf Weksler - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies.
    According to capacitism, to perceive is to employ personal-level, perceptual capacities. In a series of publications, Schellenberg (2016, 2018, 2019b, 2020) has argued that capacitism offers unified analyses of perceptual particularity, perceptual content, perceptual consciousness, perceptual evidence, and perceptual knowledge. “Capacities first” (2020: 715); appealing accounts of an impressive array of perceptual and epistemological phenomena will follow. We argue that, given the Schellenbergian way of individuating perceptual capacities which underpins the above analyses, perceiving an object does not require employing a (...)
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  3. Perceptual Attribution and Perceptual Reference.Jake Quilty-Dunn & E. J. Green - forthcoming - Wiley-Online-Library: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    Perceptual representations pick out individuals and attribute properties to them. This paper considers the role of perceptual attribution in determining or guiding perceptual reference to objects. We consider three extant models of the relation between perceptual attribution and perceptual reference–all attribution guides reference, no attribution guides reference, or a privileged subset of attributions guides reference–and argue that empirical evidence undermines all three. We then defend a flexible-attributives model, on which the range of perceptual attributives used to guide reference shifts adaptively (...)
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  4. Thinking Through Illusion.Dominic Alford‐Duguid - 2020 - European Journal of Philosophy 28 (3):617-638.
    Perception of a property (e.g. a colour, a shape, a size) can enable thought about the property, while at the same time misleading the subject as to what the property is like. This long-overlooked claim parallels a more familiar observation concerning perception-based thought about objects, namely that perception can enable a subject to think about an object while at the same time misleading her as to what the object is like. I defend the overlooked claim, and then use it to (...)
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  5. Use Your Illusion: Spatial Functionalism, Vision Science, and the Case Against Global Skepticism.E. J. Green & Gabriel Oak Rabin - 2020 - Analytic Philosophy 61 (4):345-378.
  6. Are there epistemic conditions necessary for demonstrative thought?Michael Barkasi - 2019 - Synthese 198 (7):6111-6138.
    Starting with Gareth Evans, there’s an important tradition of theorizing about perception-based demonstrative thought which assigns necessary epistemic conditions to it. Its core idea is that demonstrative reference in thought is grounded in information links, understood as links which carry reliable information about their targets and which a subject exploits for demonstrative reference by tokening the mental files fed by these links. Perception, on these views, is not fundamental to perception-based demonstrative thought but is only the information link exploited in (...)
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  7. The Role of Experience in Demonstrative Thought.Michael Barkasi - 2019 - Mind and Language 34 (5):648-666.
    Attention plays a role in demonstrative thought: It sets the targets. Visual experience also plays a role. I argue here that it makes visual information available for use in the voluntary control of focal attention. To do so I use both introspection and neurophysiological evidence from projections between areas of attentional control and neural correlates of consciousness. Campbell and Smithies also identify roles for experience, but they further argue that only experience can play those roles. In contrast, I argue that (...)
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  8. A Theory of Perceptual Objects.E. J. Green - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (3):663-693.
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView.
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  9. Binding and Differentiation in Multisensory Object Perception.E. J. Green - 2019 - Synthese 198 (5):4457-4491.
    Cognitive scientists have long known that the modalities interact during perceptual processing. Cross-modal illusions like the ventriloquism effect show that the course of processing in one modality can alter the course of processing in another. But how do the modalities interact in the specific domain of object perception? This paper distinguishes and analyzes two kinds of multisensory interaction in object perception. First, the modalities may bind features to a single object or event. Second, the modalities may cooperate when differentiating an (...)
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  10. The Problem of First-Person Aboutness.Jessica Pepp - 2019 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy (57):521-541.
    The topic of this paper is the question of in virtue of what first-person thoughts are about what they are about. I focus on a dilemma arising from this question. On the one hand, approaches to answering this question that promise to be satisfying seem doomed to be inconsistent with the seeming truism that first-person thought is always about the thinker of the thought. But on the other hand, ensuring consistency with that truism seems doomed to make any answer to (...)
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  11. Thought About Properties: Why the Perceptual Case is Basic.Dominic Alford-Duguid - 2018 - Philosophical Quarterly 68 (271):221-242.
    This paper defends a version of the old empiricist claim that to think about unobservable physical properties a subject must be able to think perception-based thoughts about observable properties. The central argument builds upon foundations laid down by G. E. M. Anscombe and P. F. Strawson. It bridges the gap separating these foundations and the target claim by exploiting a neglected connection between thought about properties and our grasp of causation. This way of bridging the gap promises to introduce substantive (...)
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  12. Singularidade fenomênica e conteúdo perceptivo.Marco Aurélio Sousa Alves - 2018 - Manuscrito 41 (1):67-91.
    The most prominent theories of perceptual content are incapable of accounting for the phenomenal particularity of perceptual experience. This difficulty, or so I argue, springs from the absence of a series of distinctions that end up turning the problem apparently unsolvable. After briefly examining the main shortcomings of representationalism and naïve realism, I advance a proposal of my own that aims to make the trivial fact of perceptually experiencing a particular object as such philosophically unproblematic. Though I am well aware (...)
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  13. Singular Thought, Cognitivism, and Conscious Attention.Heimir Geirsson - 2018 - Erkenntnis 83 (3):613-626.
    The focus of this paper will be on singular thoughts. In the first section I will present Jeshion’s cognitivism; a view that holds that one should characterize singular thoughts by their cognitive roles. In the second section I will argue that, contrary to Jeshion’s claims, results from studies of object tracking in cognitive psychology do not support cognitivism. In the third section I will discuss Jeshion’s easy transmission of singular thought and argue that it ignores a relevant distinction between general (...)
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  14. On the Explanatory Power of Hallucination.Dominic Alford-Duguid & Michael Arsenault - 2017 - Synthese 194 (5).
    Pautz has argued that the most prominent naive realist account of hallucination—negative epistemic disjunctivism—cannot explain how hallucinations enable us to form beliefs about perceptually presented properties. He takes this as grounds to reject both negative epistemic disjunctivism and naive realism. Our aims are two: First, to show that this objection is dialectically ineffective against naive realism, and second, to draw morals from the failure of this objection for the dispute over the nature of perceptual experience at large.
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  15. Visual Reference and Iconic Content.Santiago Echeverri - 2017 - Philosophy of Science 84 (4):761-781.
    Evidence from cognitive science supports the claim that humans and other animals see the world as divided into objects. Although this claim is widely accepted, it remains unclear whether the mechanisms of visual reference have representational content or are directly instantiated in the functional architecture. I put forward a version of the former approach that construes object files as icons for objects. This view is consistent with the evidence that motivates the architectural account, can respond to the key arguments against (...)
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  16. Attentive Visual Reference.E. J. Green - 2017 - Mind and Language 32 (1):3-38.
    Many have held that when a person visually attends to an object, her visual system deploys a representation that designates the object. Call the referential link between such representations and the objects they designate attentive visual reference. In this article I offer an account of attentive visual reference. I argue that the object representations deployed in visual attention—which I call attentive visual object representations —refer directly, and are akin to indexicals. Then I turn to the issue of how the reference (...)
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  17. Hume's Table, Peacocke's Trees, the Tilted Penny and the Reversed Seeing-in Account.Robert Schroer - 2017 - Mind and Language 32 (2):209-230.
    In seeing a tilted penny, we are experientially aware of both its circularity and another shape, which I dub ‘β-ellipticality’. Some claim that our experiential awareness of the intrinsic shapes/sizes of everyday objects depends upon our experiential awareness of β-shapes/β-sizes. In contrast, I maintain that β-property experiences are the result of what Richard Wollheim calls ‘seeing-in’, but run in reverse: instead of seeing a three-dimensional object in a flat surface, we see a flat surface in a three-dimensional object. Using this (...)
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  18. The Social Transmission of Direct Cognitive Relations.Julie Wulfemeyer - 2017 - Res Philosophica 94 (1):119-134.
    Both Russell and Donnellan proposed direct, non-descriptive cognitive relations between thinkers and objects. They agreed that such relations couldn’t be initiated in evidence cases, but Donnellan, unlike Russell, thought direct cognitive relations could be transmitted from person to person. Kaplan (2012) suggests the issues of initiation and transmission are separable—allowing one to deny that evidence yields direct cognition while believing direct cognition is transmittable. Here, cases involving transmission, evidence, ordinary perception, and perception aided by technology are considered. It is concluded (...)
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  19. Indexing the World? Visual Tracking, Modularity, and the Perception–Cognition Interface.Santiago Echeverri - 2016 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 67 (1):215-245.
    Research in vision science, developmental psychology, and the foundations of cognitive science has led some theorists to posit referential mechanisms similar to indices. This hypothesis has been framed within a Fodorian conception of the early vision module. The article shows that this conception is mistaken, for it cannot handle the ‘interface problem’—roughly, how indexing mechanisms relate to higher cognition and conceptual thought. As a result, I reject the inaccessibility of early vision to higher cognition and make some constructive remarks on (...)
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  20. Object Files, Properties, and Perceptual Content.Santiago Echeverri - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (2):283-307.
    Object files are mental representations that enable perceptual systems to keep track of objects as numerically the same. How is their reference fixed? A prominent approach, championed by Zenon Pylyshyn and John Campbell, makes room for a non-satisfactional use of properties to fix reference. This maneuver has enabled them to reconcile a singularist view of reference with the intuition that properties must play a role in reference fixing. This paper examines Campbell’s influential defense of this strategy. After criticizing it, a (...)
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  21. (Academia.Edu) LITERATURE I DO- THE ROMANTICS AND SUBJECTIVITY : SAMUEL TAYLOR COLERIDGE.Rituparna Ray Chaudhuri - 2015
    [ https://plus.google.com/108060242686103906748/posts/cwvdB6mK3J6 ] The phenomenal description on own thoughts regard me to describe Coleridge, along with William Wordsworth, was instrumental in initiating a poetic revolution in the early nineteenth century which is known as the Romantic Movement. Coleridge invokes the Divine Spirit that blows upon the wild Harp of Time. Time is like the stringed musical instrument on which the Spirit produces sweet harmonious melodies. Coleridge is perhaps best known for his haunting ballad Rime of Ancient Mariner, the dream-like Kubla (...)
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  22. Malebranche and the Riddle of Sensation.Walter Ott - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (3):689-712.
    Like their contemporary counterparts, early modern philosophers find themselves in a predicament. On one hand, there are strong reasons to deny that sensations are representations. For there seems to be nothing in the world for them to represent. On the other hand, some sensory representations seem to be required for us to experience bodies. How else could one perceive the boundaries of a body, except by means of different shadings of color? I argue that Nicolas Malebranche offers an extreme -- (...)
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  23. Reid’s Direct Realism and Visible Figure.Keith A. Wilson - 2013 - Philosophical Quarterly 63 (253):783-803.
    In his account of visual perception, Thomas Reid describes visible figure as both ‘real and external’ to the eye and as the ‘immediate object of sight’. These claims appear to conflict with Reid's direct realism, since if the ‘immediate’ object of vision is also its direct object, then sight would be perceptually indirect due to the role of visible figure as a perceptual intermediary. I argue that this apparent threat to Reid's direct realism may be resolved by understanding visible figure (...)
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  24. Demonstrative Content and the Experience of Properties.Hemdat Lerman - 2012 - Dialectica 66 (4):489-515.
    John McDowell (in Mind and World) and Bill Brewer (in Perception and Reason) argue that the content of our perceptual experience is conceptual in the following sense. It is of the type of content that could be the content of a judgement – that is, a content which results from the actualization of two (or more) conceptual abilities. Specifically, they suggest that the conceptual abilities actualized in experience are demonstrative abilities, and thus the resulting content is of the type we (...)
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  25. Visual Demonstratives.Mohan Matthen - 2012 - In Athanasios Raftopoulos & Peter Machamer (eds.), Perception, Realism and the Problem of Reference. Cambridge University Press.
    When I act on something, three kinds of idea (or representation) come into play. First, I have a non-visual representation of my goals. Second, I have a visual description of the kind of thing that I must act upon in order to satisfy my goals. Finally, I have an egocentric position locator that enables my body to interact with the object. It is argued here that these ideas are distinct. It is also argued that the egocentric position locator functions in (...)
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  26. A Brief Note on How Phenomenal Objects Relate to Objects Themselves.Max Velmans - 2011 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (11-12):199-202.
    This brief note corrects some basic errors in Meijsing's JCS paper on 'The Whereabouts of Pictorial Space', concerning the status of phenomenal objects in the reflexive model of perception. In particular I clarify the precise sense in which a phenomenal object relates to the object itself in visual perception.
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  27. The Perceptual Basis of Demonstrative Reference: From Sensory Identification to Thought.Felipe Nogueira de Carvalho - 2010 - Saarbrucken: LAP Lambert Academic Publishing.
    In order to demonstratively refer to an object, we must perceive it. That much is clear on the philosophy of perception and language; but how does perception explain the intentionality of thought? Philosophical tradition has internalized and over- intellectualized the relations we have with the material objects we perceive and think about, making the task of naturalizing the semantic relation of reference much more difficult than it already is. Drawing on current research in contemporary vision science, Carvalho argues that what (...)
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  28. Five Theses on De Re States and Attitudes.Tyler Burge - 2009 - In Joseph Almog & Paolo Leonardi (eds.), The Philosophy of David Kaplan. Oxford University Press. pp. 246--324.
    I shall propose five theses on de re states and attitudes. To be a de re state or attitude is to bear a peculiarly direct epistemic and representational relation to a particular referent in perception or thought. I will not dress this bare statement here. The fifth thesis tries to be less coarse. The first four explicate and restrict context- bound, singular, empirical representation, which constitutes a significant and central type of de re state or attitude.
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  29. Consciousness and Reference.John Campbell - 2009 - In Brian McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press.
  30. Singular Thought: In Defense of Acquaintance.Francois Recanati - 2009 - In Robin Jeshion (ed.), New Essays on Singular Thought. Oxford University Press. pp. 141.
    This paper is about the Descriptivism/Singularism debate, which has loomed large in 20-century philosophy of language and mind. My aim is to defend Singularism by showing, first, that it is a better and more promising view than even the most sophisticated versions of Descriptivism, and second, that the recent objections to Singularism (based on a dismissal of the acquaintance constraint on singular thought) miss their target.
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  31. The Situation-Dependency of Perception.Susanna Schellenberg - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (2):55-84.
    I argue that perception is necessarily situation-dependent. The way an object is must not just be distinguished from the way it appears and the way it is represented, but also from the way it is presented given the situational features. First, I argue that the way an object is presented is best understood in terms of external, mind-independent, but situation-dependent properties of objects. Situation-dependent properties are exclusively sensitive to and ontologically dependent on the intrinsic properties of objects, such as their (...)
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  32. Wider den Empirismus bezüglich Farbbegriffen.Sven Bernecker - 2007 - In Jakob Steinbrenner & Stefan Glasauer (eds.), Farben: Betrachtungen aus Philosophie und Naturwissenschaften. Suhrkamp. pp. 248-273.
    Der in der zeitgenössischen Philosophie vorherrschende Empirismus hinsichtlich des Erwerbs von Farbbegriffen besagt: S erwirbt den Farbbegriff F nur dann, wenn S phänomenale Erlebnisse gemacht hat, die von einem Gegenstand, der die durch den Farbbegriff F bezeichnete Farbe aufweist, auf geeignete Weise kausal verursacht sind. Der Empirismus hinsichtlich des Erwerbs von Farbbegriffen geht Hand in Hand mit dem Empirismus hinsichtlich der Speicherung von Farbbegriffen: S hat zum Zeitpunkt t2 den zum Zeitpunkt t1 erworbenen Farbbegriff F nur dann gespeichert, wenn S (...)
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  33. Attention and Inscrutability: A Commentary on John Campbell, Reference and Consciousness.Austen Clark - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 127 (2):167-193.
    We assemble here in this time and place to discuss the thesis that conscious attention can provide knowledge of reference of perceptual demonstratives. I shall focus my commentary on what this claim means, and on the main argument for it found in the first five chapters of "Reference and Consciousness". The middle term of that argument is an account of what attention does: what its job or function is. There is much that is admirable in this account, and I am (...)
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  34. On Visual Experience of Objects: Comments on John Campbell's Reference and Consciousness.Mohan Matthen - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 127 (2):195-220.
    John Campbell argues that visual attention to objects is the means by which we can refer to objects, and that this is so because conscious visual attention enables us to retrieve information about a location. It is argued here that while Campbell is right to think that we visually attend to objects, he does not give us sufficient ground for thinking that consciousness is involved, and is wrong to assign an intermediary role to location. Campbell’s view on sortals is also (...)
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  35. Nonconceptual Demonstrative Reference.Athanassius Raftopoulos & Vincent C. Müller - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (2):251-285.
    The paper argues that the reference of perceptual demonstratives is fixed in a causal nondescriptive way through the nonconceptual content of perception. That content consists first in spatiotemporal information establishing the existence of a separate persistent object retrieved from a visual scene by the perceptual object segmentation processes that open an object-file for that object. Nonconceptual content also consists in other transducable information, that is, information that is retrieved directly in a bottom-up way from the scene (motion, shape, etc). The (...)
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  36. Content, Mode, and Self-Reference.François Recanati - 2006 - In Savas L. Tsohatzidis (ed.), John Searle's Philosophy of Language: Force, Meaning, and Mind. Cambridge University Press. pp. 49-63.
    In this paper I argue that the self-referential component which Searle rightly detects in the truth-conditions of perceptual judgments comes from the perceptual ‘mode' and is not an aspect of the ‘content' of the judgment, contrary to Searle's claim.
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  37. Precis of Reference and Consciousness.John Campbell - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 126 (1):103-114.
  38. Reference as Attention.John Campbell - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 120 (1-3):265-76.
  39. Reference and Attention: A Difficult Connection. [REVIEW]Sean Dorrance Kelly - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 120 (1-3):277-86.
    I am very much in sympathy with the overall approach of John Campbell’s paper, “Reference as Attention”. My sympathy extends to a variety of its features. I think he is right to suppose, for instance, that neuropsychological cases provide important clues about how we should treat some traditional philosophical problems concerning perception and reference. I also think he is right to suppose that there are subtle but important relations between the phenomena of perception, action, consciousness, attention, and reference. I even (...)
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  40. Perception and the Physical World: Psychological and Philosophical Issues in Perception.Dieter Heyer & Rainer Mausfeld (eds.) - 2002 - Wiley.
    The focus of this book is on conceptual and philosophical issues of perception including the classic notion of unconscious inferences in perception. The book consists of contributions from a group of internationally renowned researchers who spent a year together as distinguised fellows at the German Centre for Advanced Study.
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  41. The Physicalistic Trap in Perception Theory.Rainer Mausfeld - 2002 - In Dieter Heyer & Rainer Mausfeld (eds.), Perception and the Physical World. Wiley.
    The chapter deals with misconceptions in perception theory that are based on the idea of slicing the nature of perception along the joints of physics and on corresponding ill-conceived ʹpurposesʹ and ʹgoalsʹ of the perceptual system. It argues that the conceptual structure underlying the percept cannot be inferentially attained from the sensory input. The output of the perceptual system, namely meaningful categories, is evidently vastly underdetermined by the sensory input, namely physico-geometric energy patterns. Thus, the core task of perception theory (...)
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  42. Sensing and Reference.Austen Clark - 2000
    When I was revising _Sensory Qualities_ there was a period of about a year when I set the manuscript aside and did other things. When I returned to it I found that certain portions of the argument had collapsed of their own weight, like an old New England barn, and could be carted off the premises without compunction. Other parts were wobbling on their foundation, while some had weathered well and seemed nice and solid. My revision strategy was simple: I (...)
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  43. Seeing and Demonstration.John Hawthorne & Mark Scala - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (1):199-206.
    We see things. We also perceptually demonstrate things. There seems to be some sort of link between these two phenomena. Indeed. in the standard case, the former is accompanied by a capacity for the latter. One sees a dog and can, on the basis of one’s perceptual capacities, think thoughts of the form ‘That is F’. But how strong is that link? Does seeing a thing inevitably bring with it the capacity for perceptually demonstrating it? In what follows, we argue (...)
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  44. Immunity to Error Through Misidentification and the Meaning of a Referring Term.John Campbell - 1999 - Philosophical Topics 26 (1-2):89-104.
  45. Subjectivity, Objectivity, and Theories of Reference in Evans' Theory of Thought.Adrian Cussins - 1999 - Electronic Journal of Analytic Philosophy.
    This paper explores some problems with Gareth Evans’s theory of the fundamental and non-fundamental levels of thought [1]. I suggest a way to reconceive the levels of thought that overcomes these problems. But, first, why might anyone who was not already struck by Evans’s remarkable theory care about these issues? What’s at stake here?
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  46. La Filosofia Analitica En El Cambio de Milenio.Olga Prat Fernández - 1999 - Santiago de Compostela: S.I.E.U.
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  47. Perceptual Consciousness and the Reflexive Character of Attention.Olga Prat Fernández - 1999 - In La Filosofia Analitica En El Cambio de Milenio. Santiago de Compostela: S.I.E.U.
  48. Sense and Consciousness.John Campbell - 1998 - In Grazer Philosophische Studien. Atlanta: Rodopi. pp. 195-211.
    On a classical conception, knowing the sense of a proposition is knowing its truth-condition, rather than simply knowing how to verify the proposition, or how to find its implications (whether deductive implications or implications for action). But knowing the truth-condition of a proposition is not unrelated to your use of particular methods for verifying the proposition, or finding its implications. Rather, your knowledge of the truth-condition of the proposition has to justify the use of particular methods for verifying it, or (...)
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  49. New Essays on the Philosophy of Michael Dummett.John Campbell (ed.) - 1998 - Atlanta: Rodopi.
    Ever since the publication of 'Truth' in 1959 Sir Michael Dummett has been acknowledged as one of the most profoundly creative and influential of contemporary philosophers. His contributions to the philosophy of thought and language, logic, the philosophy of mathematics, and metaphysics have set the terms of some of most fruitful discussions in philosophy. His work on Frege stands unparalleled, both as landmark in the history of philosophy and as a deep reflection on the defining commitments of the analytic school. (...)
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  50. Physical, Psychological and Virtual Realities.Max Velmans - 1998 - In John Wood (ed.), The Virtual Embodied: Presence, Practice, Technology. London: Routledge. pp. 45-60.
    This chapter examines the similarities and differences between physical, psychological and virtual realities, and challenges some conventional, implicitly dualist assumptions about how these relate to each other. Virtual realities are not easily understood in either dualist or materialist reductive terms, as they exemplify the reflexive nature of perception. The chapter summarises some of the evidence for this “reflexive model”—and examines some of its consequences for the “hard” problem of consciousness. The chapter then goes on to consider how these realities might (...)
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