Intention, responsibility and double effect

Philosophical Quarterly 32 (126):1-16 (1982)
I discuss a significant distinction between two different applications of the principle of double effect. It serves sometimes to distinguish the intended effects of an action from side-Effects which are "relevant" to it, As providing reasons against it, For which the agent must admit responsibility, And of which he is the intentional agent; and sometimes to distinguish intended effects from side-Effects which are "irrelevant" to the action, As to which the agent denies responsibility and intentional agency
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DOI 10.2307/2218997
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