Acta Analytica:1-21 (forthcoming)

Authors
Jonathan Egeland
University of Stavanger
Abstract
Considerations of scientific evidence are often thought to provide externalism with the dialectical upper hand in the internalism–externalism debate. How so? A couple of reasons are forthcoming in the literature. (1) Williamson (2000) argues that the E = K thesis (in contrast to internalism) provides the best explanation for the fact that scientists appear to argue from premises about true propositions (or facts) that are common knowledge among the members of the scientific community. (2) Kelly (Philosophy Compass, 3 (5), 933–955, 2008; 2016) argues that only externalism is suited to account for the public character of scientific evidence. In this article, I respond to Williamson and Kelly’s arguments. First, I show that the E = K thesis isn’t supported by the way in which we talk about scientific evidence, and that it is unable to account for facts about what has been regarded as scientific evidence and as justified scientific belief in the history of science. Second, I argue that there are internalist views that can account for the publicity of scientific evidence, and that those views indeed do better in that regard than the (externalist) view proposed by Kelly. The upshot is that considerations of scientific evidence do not favor externalism over internalism.
Keywords scientific evidence  evidence  justification  epistemic internalism  epistemic externalism  publicity
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s12136-021-00491-z
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Internalism and Externalism.B. J. C. Madison - 2017 - In Sven Bernecker & Kourken Michaelian (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory. Routledge. pp. 283-295.
Two Notions of Scientific Justification.Matthias Adam - 2007 - Synthese 158 (1):93 - 108.
Goldman Against Internalism.Laurence BonJour - 2016 - In Brian P. McLaughlin & Hilary Kornblith (eds.), Goldman and His Critics. Blackwell.
Epistemic Internalism.Bjc Madison - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (10):840-853.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2021-08-24

Total views
30 ( #366,321 of 2,454,501 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
30 ( #25,398 of 2,454,501 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes