Against the generalised theory of function

Biology and Philosophy 37 (4):1-25 (2022)
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Abstract

Justin Garson has recently advanced a Generalised Selected Effects Theory of biological proper function. According to Garson, his theory spells trouble for the Dysfunction Account of Disorder. This paper argues that Garson’s critique of the Dysfunction Account from the Generalised Theory fails, and that we should reject the Generalised Theory outright. I first show that the Generalised Theory does not, as Garson asserts, imply that neurally selected disorders are not dysfunctional. Rather, it implies that they are both functional and dysfunctional. I argue on this basis that the Generalised Theory yields conflicting functional norms, and we that should reject it outright on these grounds.

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unknown Fagerberg, Harriet (2022) "Against the generalised theory of function".

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Harriet Fagerberg
Cambridge University

References found in this work

Functional analysis.Robert E. Cummins - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (November):741-64.
Health as a theoretical concept.Christopher Boorse - 1977 - Philosophy of Science 44 (4):542-573.
What Biological Functions Are and Why They Matter.Justin Garson - 2019 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
In defense of proper functions.Ruth Millikan - 1989 - Philosophy of Science 56 (June):288-302.

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