Making Sense of Your Freedom: Philosophy for the Perplexed

Ithaca: Cornell University Press (1994)
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Abstract

Written for general readers and students, this book provides an accessible and brief metaphysical defense of freedom. James W. Felt, S.J., invites his audience to consider that we are responsible for what we do precisely because we do it freely. His perspective runs counter to the philosophers who argue that the freedom humans feel in their actions is merely an illusion. Felt argues in detail that there are no compelling reasons for thinking we are not free, and very strong ones for thinking that we are. The view that Felt develops parallels that of the French philosopher Henri Bergson. In the course of his analysis, Felt considers determinism, compatibilism, agency, and the problem of evil. Featuring an updated list of suggested readings, this clearly and engagingly written introductory work is ideal for the undergraduate classroom

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The time of activity.Theodore R. Schatzki - 2006 - Continental Philosophy Review 39 (2):155-182.

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