Synthese 191 (6):1037-1050 (2014)

Authors
Luciano Floridi
Oxford University
Abstract
In this article, I define and then defend the principle of information closure (pic) against a sceptical objection similar to the one discussed by Dretske in relation to the principle of epistemic closure. If I am successful, given that pic is equivalent to the axiom of distribution and that the latter is one of the conditions that discriminate between normal and non-normal modal logics, a main result of such a defence is that one potentially good reason to look for a formalization of the logic of “ $S$ is informed that $p$ ” among the non-normal modal logics, which reject the axiom, is also removed. This is not to argue that the logic of “ $S$ is informed that $p$ ” should be a normal modal logic, but that it could still be insofar as the objection that it could not be, based on the sceptical objection against pic, has been removed. In other word, I shall argue that the sceptical objection against pic fails, so such an objection provides no ground to abandon the normal modal logic B (also known as KTB) as a formalization of “ $S$ is informed that $p$ ”, which remains plausible insofar as this specific obstacle is concerned
Keywords Epistemic closure  Information closure  Modal logic B (KTB)   Normal modal logic  Non-normal modal logic  Principle of information closure  Sceptical objection
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-013-0306-0
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References found in this work BETA

Philosophical Explanations.Robert Nozick - 1981 - Harvard University Press.
Knowledge and Belief.Jaakko Hintikka - 1962 - Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
The Philosophy of Information.Luciano Floridi - 2011 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Safety, Closure, and the Flow of Information.Jens Kipper - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (5):1109-1126.
Information, Epistemic Luck and Generality.Abel Wajnerman Paz - 2017 - Eidos: Revista de Filosofía de la Universidad Del Norte 26:326-354.

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

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