A Fregean Solution to the Paradox of Analysis

Grazer Philosophische Studien 37 (1):59-73 (1990)
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Abstract

The paradox of analysis is the problem of formulating analyses that avoid the metaphilosophical dilemma of uninformativeness where analysandum and analysans are identical in meaning, and incorrectness or unsoundness where analysandum and analysans are nonidentical in meaning. Frege's distinction between sense and reference supports an intentional solution to the paradox, incorporating Roderick M. Chisholm's concept of converse intentional properties. Formal definitions of unrestricted Leibnizian or conceptual identity and referential identity or codesignation are provided, under which analysanda and analysantia are referentially identical, guaranteeing informativeness, of philosophically correct analyses.

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