Philosophers adrift? Comments on the alleged disunity of method

Philosophy of Science 60 (3):500-512 (1993)
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Abstract

R. Laudan and L. Laudan (1989) have put forth a new model intended to solve the problem of disagreement, the problem of consensus, and the problem of innovation in science. In support of this model they cite the history of the acceptance of continental drift, or plate tectonics. In this discussion, I claim that this episode does not constitute an instance of their model. The historical evidence does not support this model. Indeed, closer examination seems to weaken it. I also sketch an alternative model

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Matthias Kaiser
University of Bergen

Citations of this work

The empirical character of methodological rules.Warren Schmaus - 1996 - Philosophy of Science 63 (3):106.
The Empirical Character of Methodological Rules.Warren Schmaus - 1996 - Philosophy of Science 63 (5):S98-S106.
Why geophysics?N. Oreskes, Fleming &unknown & R. J. - 2000 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 31 (3):253-257.
Why Geophysics?Naomi Oreskes & James R. Fleming - 2000 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 31 (3):253-257.

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