Predictivism and old evidence: a critical look at climate model tuning

European Journal for Philosophy of Science 5 (2):171-190 (2015)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Many climate scientists have made claims that may suggest that evidence used in tuning or calibrating a climate model cannot be used to evaluate the model. By contrast, the philosophers Katie Steele and Charlotte Werndl have argued that, at least within the context of Bayesian confirmation theory, tuning is simply an instance of hypothesis testing. In this paper I argue for a weak predictivism and in support of a nuanced reading of climate scientists’ concerns about tuning: there are cases, model-tuning among them, in which predictive successes are more highly confirmatory of a model than accommodation of evidence

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 76,140

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Climate models, confirmation and calibration.Charlotte Werndl & Katie Steele - 2013 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 64 (3):609-635.
Climate Models, Calibration, and Confirmation.Katie Steele & Charlotte Werndl - 2013 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 64 (3):609-635.
Varieties of support and confirmation of climate models.Elisabeth A. Lloyd - 2009 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 83 (1):213-232.
Fine-tuning as evidence for a multiverse: why White is wrong. [REVIEW]Mark Douglas Saward - 2013 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 73 (3):243-253.
The epistemology of climate models and some of its implications for climate science and the philosophy of science.Joel Katzav - 2014 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 46 (2):228-238.
The fine-tuning argument.Neil A. Manson - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (1):271-286.
Fine-tuning and the infrared bull’s-eye.John T. Roberts - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 160 (2):287-303.
Understanding pluralism in climate modeling.Wendy Parker - 2006 - Foundations of Science 11 (4):349-368.
Confirmation and Robustness of Climate Models.Elisabeth A. Lloyd - 2010 - Philosophy of Science 77 (5):971–984.
Model tuning in engineering: uncovering the logic.Katie Steele & Charlotte Werndl - 2015 - Journal of Strain Analysis for Engineering Design 51 (1):63-71.
God, fine-tuning, and the problem of old evidence.Bradley Monton - 2006 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (2):405-424.
Cartesian Knowledge and Confirmation.Joel Pust - 2007 - Journal of Philosophy 104 (6):269-289.

Analytics

Added to PP
2015-03-19

Downloads
80 (#153,631)

6 months
2 (#297,033)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Mathias Frisch
Universität Hannover

Citations of this work

Climate Models: How to Assess Their Reliability.Martin Carrier & Johannes Lenhard - 2019 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 32 (2):81-100.
Understanding climate phenomena with data-driven models.Benedikt Knüsel & Christoph Baumberger - 2020 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 84 (C):46-56.

View all 13 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

How the Laws of Physics Lie.Nancy Cartwright - 1983 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
Holism, entrenchment, and the future of climate model pluralism.Johannes Lenhard & Eric Winsberg - 2010 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 41 (3):253-262.
Climate Models, Calibration, and Confirmation.Katie Steele & Charlotte Werndl - 2013 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 64 (3):609-635.
II—Wendy S. Parker: Confirmation and adequacy-for-Purpose in Climate Modelling.Wendy S. Parker - 2009 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 83 (1):233-249.

View all 19 references / Add more references