Basic Conditional Reasoning: How Children Mimic Counterfactual Reasoning

Studia Logica 102 (4):793-810 (2014)
  Copy   BIBTEX


Children approach counterfactual questions about stories with a reasoning strategy that falls short of adults’ Counterfactual Reasoning (CFR). It was dubbed “Basic Conditional Reasoning” (BCR) in Rafetseder et al. (Child Dev 81(1):376–389, 2010). In this paper we provide a characterisation of the differences between BCR and CFR using a distinction between permanent and nonpermanent features of stories and Lewis/Stalnaker counterfactual logic. The critical difference pertains to how consistency between a story and a conditional antecedent incompatible with a nonpermanent feature of the story is achieved. Basic conditional reasoners simply drop all nonpermanent features of the story. Counterfactual reasoners preserve as much of the story as possible while accommodating the antecedent.

Similar books and articles

Recognition of proofs in conditional reasoning.John Best - 2005 - Thinking and Reasoning 11 (4):326 – 348.
Why do the Laws Support Counterfactuals?Chris Dorst - 2020 - Erkenntnis 87 (2):545-566.


Added to PP

389 (#55,585)

6 months
101 (#55,559)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author Profiles

Josef Perner
University of Salzburg
Eva Rafetseder
University of Stirling
Brian Leahy
Harvard University

References found in this work

Generics and the structure of the mind.Sarah-Jane Leslie - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):375–403.
Counterfactuals.Dorothy Edgington - 2008 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108 (1pt1):1-21.
Generics and defaults.Francis Jeffry Pelletier & Nicholas Asher - 1997 - In J. F. A. K. Van Benthem, Johan van Benthem & Alice G. B. Ter Meulen (eds.), Handbook of Logic and Language. Elsevier.
I-Counterfactuals.Dorothy Edgington - 2008 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108 (1pt1):1-21.

View all 9 references / Add more references