Croatian Journal of Philosophy 4 (1):149-156 (2004)
AbstractAccording to one influential view, advanced by Jonathan Adler, David Owens and Susan Hurley, epistemic akrasia is impossible because when we form a full belief, any apparent evidence against that belief loses its power over us. Thus theoretical reasoning is quite unlike practical reasoning, in that in the latter our desires continue to exert a pull, even when they are outweighed by countervailing considerations. I call this argument against the possibility of epistemic akrasia the subsumption view. The subsumption view accurately reflects the nature of reasoning in a range of everyday cases. But, as I show, it is quite false with regard to controversial questions, like philosophical disputes. In these, evidence against our best judgments continues to exert a hold on us. Thus, the claimed disanalogy between practical and theoretical reasoning fails
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Citations of this work
Moore's Paradox and Akratic Belief.Eugene Chislenko - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (3):669-690.
Epistemic Akrasia.Brian Ribeiro - 2011 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 1 (1):18-25.
Epistemic Akrasia and Mental Agency.Cristina Borgoni - 2015 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):827-842.
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