Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5-6):514-515 (2007)

Authors
Joseph Levine
University of Massachusetts, Amherst
Abstract
I explore the implications of recognizing two forms of access that might be constitutively related to phenomenal consciousness. I argue, in support of Block, that we don't have good reason to think that the link to reporting mechanisms is the kind of access that distinguishes an experience from a mere state
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DOI 10.1017/S0140525X07002956
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Perceptual Consciousness Overflows Cognitive Access.Ned Block - 2011 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 15 (12):567-575.
Consciousness and Cognitive Access.Ned Block - 2008 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108 (1pt3):289-317.

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